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Abstract
How many rounds and which computational assumptions are needed for concurrent non-
malleable commitments? The above question has puzzled researchers for several years.
Recently, Pass in [TCC 2013] proved a lower bound of 3 rounds when security is proven
through black-box reductions to falsifiable assumptions. On the other side, positive results of
Goyal [STOC 2011], Lin and Pass [STOC 2011] and Goyal et al. [FOCS 2012] showed that
one-way functions are sufficient with a constant (at least 6) number of rounds. More recently
Ciampi et al. [CRYPTO 2016] showed that subexponentially strong one-way permutations are
sufficient with just 3 rounds.
In this work we almost close the above open question by showing a 4-round concurrent non-
malleable commitment scheme that only needs one-way functions. Our main technique consists
in showing how to upgrade basic forms of non-malleability (i.e., non-malleability w.r.t. non-
aborting adversaries) to full-fledged non-malleability without penalizing the round complexity.
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1 Introduction
Commitment schemes and zero-knowledge argument systems are fundamental primitives in Cryp-
tography. Here we consider the intriguing question of constructing round-efficient schemes that
remain secure even against man-in-the-middle (MiM) attacks: non-malleable (NM) commitments
and NM zero-knowledge (NMZK) argument systems [DDN91].
Non-malleable commitments. The round complexity of commitment schemes in the stand-
alone setting is well understood. Non-interactive commitments exist assuming the existence of
one-to-one one-way functions [GL89], and 2-round commitments exist assuming the existence of
one-way functions (OWFs) only. Moreover non-interactive commitments do not exist if one relies
on the black-box use of OWFs only [MP12].
Instead, the round complexity of NM commitments1 after 25 years of research remains a fascinat-
ing open question, in particular when taking into account the required computational assumptions.
The original construction of [DDN91] required a logarithmic number of rounds and the sole use
of OWFs. Then, through a long sequence of very exciting positive results [Bar02, PR03, PR05b,
PR05a, PR08b, PR08a, LPV08, PW10, Wee10, LP11b, LP15, Goy11, GLOV12], the above open
question has been in part solved obtaining a constant2-round (even concurrent) NM commitment
scheme by using any OWF in a black-box fashion. On the negative side, Pass recently proved that
NM commitments require at least 3 rounds [Pas13]3 when security is proved through a black-box
reduction to falsifiable (polynomial or subexponential time) hardness assumptions.
The basic case where the adversary plays only with one sender and one receiver has been
addressed by Goyal et al. [GRRV14] that showed a one-one 4-round NM commitment scheme
based on OWFs only4. A recent breakthrough of Goyal et al. [GPR16] exploited the use of the
NM codes in the split-state model of Aggarwal et al. [ADL14] to show a 3-round one-one NM
commitment scheme based on the black-box use of any one-to-one OWF5.
A new result of Ciampi et al. [COSV16] obtains concurrent non-malleability in 3 rounds
but their security proof relies on the existence of one-way permutations (OWPs) secure against
subexponential-time adversaries6.
1In this paper we will consider only NM commitments w.r.t. commitments. For the case of NM w.r.t. decommit-
ments see [PR05b, PR08b, OPV09, CVZ10, DMRV13].
2The construction of [GLOV12] can be squeezed to 6 rounds (see [GRRV14]).
3If instead one relies on non-standard assumptions or trusted setups (e.g., using trusted parameters, working
in the random oracle model, relying on the existence of NM OWFs) then there exist non-interactive NM commit-
ments [DG03, PPV08].
4The initial version of [GRRV14] claims concurrent non-malleability. Later on we have found an error in the
security proof (that also applies to the construction of [BGR+15]) and the claim on concurrent non-malleability has
then been withdrawn in the recent eprint version of [GRRV14] where a new scheme is presented and proved one-one
non-malleable.
5While [GPR16] only claimed one-one non-malleability, the difficulty of achieving concurrent non-malleability
was discussed in [COSV16] where Ciampi et al. showed an explicit successful concurrent man-in-the-middle for the
preliminary eprint version of [GPR16].
6Hardness assumptions against subexponential-time adversaries were already used [PR03, PW10, Wee10] to im-
prove the round-complexity of NM commitments.
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Non-malleable zero knowledge. The progress on NMZK arguments has tightly followed ad-
vances on NM commitments7. The construction of [GRRV14] has closed this line of research since
they showed a 4-round NMZK argument of knowledge (AoK) that relies on the existence of OWFs
only. This result is clearly optimal both in round complexity and in computational assumptions.
Interestingly, several years after the 4-round zero knowledge (ZK) argument system from OWFs
of [BJY97], the same optimal round complexity and optimal complexity assumptions have been
shown sufficient for NMZK [GRRV14] and resettably sound ZK [COP+14].
Delayed-input protocols. In [LS90] Lapidot and Shamir showed a 3-round witness-indistinguishable
(WI) proof of knowledge (PoK) for NP where the instance (except its length) and the wit-
ness are not needed before playing the last round. This “delayed-input” form of completeness
has been critically used in the past (e.g., [KO04, DPV04a, YZ07, Wee10]) and very recently
(e.g., [CPS+16a, CPS+16b, GMPP16, COSV16, HV16a, MV16]), since it often helps in improving
the round complexity of an external protocol.
1.1 Our Results
In this paper we show techniques that starting with basic non-malleability features allow us to
obtain full-fledged non-malleability. By relying on such techniques, we show the first 4-round con-
current non-malleable commitment scheme under standard assumptions. Our commitment scheme
relies on the minimal assumption of the existence of one-way functions. In light of the lower bound
of Pass [Pas13], our work nearly closes the long-standing open questions of the round and compu-
tational complexities of concurrent non-malleable commitments. We stress that when just relying
on one-way functions the construction of [GPR16] needs 4 rounds and achieves one-one NM only.
Our approach: non-malleability upgrades. Previous constructions for NM commitments and
NMZK arguments are usually complicated and start from basic and extremely malleable tools likes
regular commitment schemes and zero-knowledge proofs. Obtaining non-malleability from such
basic building blocks is a well known complicated task and achieving it in a round-efficient way
has always been a major challenge. Given the above indisputable difficulties, security proofs are
usually very non-trivial and can be difficult to study and re-use. Here we take a different approach
that consists of starting with a very basic and limited form of non-malleability, to then upgrade it
to the desired notions.
Informally, we say that a commitment scheme is weak non-malleable if it is non-malleable w.r.t.
adversaries that never commit to ⊥ when receiving honestly computed commitments. Moreover,
we say that an adversary is synchronous if all (i.e., both left and right) sessions are played in
parallel. Clearly the design of a synchronous weak one-one NM commitment scheme can be an
easier task and schemes with such limited non-malleability guarantees might exist with improved
round complexity, efficiency and complexity assumptions compared to previous work achieving full-
fledged non-malleability. Last but not least, the security proof of a synchronous weak NM protocol
is potentially much simpler to write in a robust and easy to read way than security proofs for
full-fledged non-malleability.
7For NMZK we will omit the case of polynomially many concurrent sessions since there is a logarithmic lower
bound on the round complexity of concurrent NMZK [CKPR01] with black-box simulation. While this lower bound
has been matched by Barak et al. [BPS06], no non-black-box construction is known with sub-logarithmic rounds.
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We will sometimes assume that the last round of the receiver of the underlying (limited) NM
commitment scheme (i.e., the weak non-malleable commitment scheme that we use as subprotocol)
be simulatable without having the private coins used to compute the previous message of the
receiver. This constraint clearly disappears when considering a 3-round protocol, and is clearly
satisfied by any public-coin protocol. Recent work on NM commitments includes 3-round and 4-
round constructions that are also public coin and can be used as subprotocols in our constructions.
Improved state-of-the art. In this work we provide the following main result8.
Starting with any 4-round public-coin weak one-many NM commitment scheme Π, we show
how to obtain a 4-round concurrent NM commitment scheme by only requiring one-way functions.
As a consequence of our result, by starting with the preliminary protocol Π4 of [GRRV14] (i.e.,
their basic construction without the zero-knowledge argument of knowledge) we obtain 4-round
concurrent NM commitments from OWFs. A comparison with positive results in the state of the
art can be found in Table 1.
Paper No. Rounds Assumption Concurrency
Goyal, STOC 2011 ≥ 6 OWFs Yes
Lin and Pass, STOC 2011 ≥ 6 OWFs Yes
Goyal et al., FOCS 2012 ≥ 6 BB OWFs Yes
Goyal et al., FOCS 2014 4 OWFs No
Goyal, Pandey and Richelson, STOC 2016 3 BB OWPs No
Ciampi et al., CRYPTO 2016 3 subexp. OWPs Yes
This work 4 OWFs Yes
Table 1: Comparison with recent positive results.
We also show the following results on non-malleable zero knowledge. Given a 4-round public-coin
one-one NM extractable commitment scheme Π, we show how to obtain a 4-round delayed-input
NMZK AoK assuming CRHFs. By using the construction Π3 of [GPR16] (in 4 rounds it needs
OWFs only) we obtain a 4-round delayed-input NMZK AoK from CRHFs.
We finally give the following result on 3-round non-malleable commitments. Given a 3-round
synchronous weak one-one NM commitment scheme Π, we show how to obtain a 3-round ex-
tractable one-one NM commitment scheme Π′ assuming OWPs secure against subexponential-time
adversaries. By using either Π3 or Π4 (both are based on OWPs when implemented in 3 rounds)
we obtain a 3-round extractable one-one NM commitment scheme Π′. Notice that the compiler
of [COSV16] on input Π′ gives 3-round concurrent NM commitments from subexponentially strong
OWPs. Our result improves the instantiability of the compiler of [COSV16] since we can obtain 3-
round concurrent NM commitments admitting one more9 candidate as underlying (limited) one-one
NM commitment scheme.
Remark 1: on the need of public-coin protocols. We will sometimes require the underlying
protocols to be public coin because in a reduction we will have to simulate the last round of the
receiver without knowing the randomness he used to compute the previous round. Of course the
public-coin property satisfies the above requirement and moreover the constructions [GRRV14,
8When considering a 4-round commitment scheme we always assume that the sender plays the 4th round.
9COSV16 can only usedΠ3.
5
GPR16] that we use as subprotocol are public-coin protocols. It is straightforward to notice that
any 3-round protocol would also let us conclude successfully the reduction since there is no previous
round played by the receiver. Just for simplicity we state our theorems requiring the public-coin
property.
1.2 Technical Overview
Non-malleability upgrades. In contrast to previous work, we take a different approach to
achieve non-malleability. Our goal is to start with a commitment scheme Π that enjoys some
partial non-malleability features only. For instance, we assume that the initial scheme is non-
malleable in case the adversary never commits to ⊥ when receiving a well formed commitment.
Also we consider a limitation on the scheduling of the messages, requiring that the adversary be
synchronous. We notice that this type of commitment scheme corresponds to the initial subpro-
tocol given in [GRRV14] as well as the first subprotocol given in [GPR16]. We also require some
subprotocols to be public coin (see Remark 1 for further details).
Next we show how to upgrade these limited forms of non-malleability to the desired non-
malleability. Our proof approach makes use of a common structure in our protocols consisting
of a subprotocol useful to extract a trapdoor from the adversary. We implement this extraction
by assuming standard polynomial-time OWFs and CRHFs when 3 rounds are available to get the
trapdoor (we will extract two signatures from the adversary under the same public key, following
previous ideas of [DPV04b, GJO+13, CPS13, COP+14]), and by assuming subexponentially strong
OWPs (similarly to [COSV16]) otherwise (indeed in this case there are only 2 rounds, therefore
rewinds are useless and instead we will invert through brute-force search an element in the range
of a OWP sent by the adversary).
We will make use of a delayed-input PoK where the prover proves knowledge of either a well
formed message/randomness pair certifying the correctness of the execution of Π (in the case of
NMZK this PoK also proves that the message is a witness) or of signatures of messages. Inter-
estingly, through the combined use of special trapdoor commitments and special honest-verifier
zero-knowledge delayed-input proofs of knowledge we can avoid issues related to an adversary that
maliciously commits both to valid messages and to ⊥ in polynomially many concurrent sessions10.
Delayed-input NMZK. The above discussion is not sufficient for delayed-input NMZK. The
reason is that the commitment scheme Π could require the message to commit before the last
round. We address this point by instead using Π to commit to a random string s0 and in sending
in the last round a string s1 such that w = s0 ⊕ s1 is a witness. This technique was introduced
in [COSV16] to obtain delayed-input NM commitments.
Efficiency. The above description of our constructions seems to indicate that our results are
interesting only from a theoretical point of view, mainly because of the NP reductions required
10We have designed successful aborting strategies for the one-one non-malleability of the initial version of [GRRV14]
and of [BGR+15] and for the concurrent non-malleability of last eprint version of [GRRV14]. More precisely, our
adversaries crucially rely on completing some commitments that correspond to ⊥ and that therefore can not be
opened anymore, therefore the adversary is implicitly aborting. In other contexts, other different abort attacks have
been shown recently in literature [SV12, ORSV13, HPV15] and this makes somewhat evident that abort attacks
can be very subtle and tough to detect even in the provable security framework. Recently the case of non-aborting
adversaries has been considered in [HV16b], and this can be related to our notion of weak non-malleable commitments,
where the adversary is not allowed to commit to ⊥.
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by the delayed-input WIPoK [LS90]. However we point out that depending on the existence of an
efficient Σ-protocol for the weak/synchronous NM commitment schemes used in our constructions,
the new OR-composition technique of Σ-protocols of [CPS+16a] could replace [LS90] avoiding NP
reductions. Tweaking and instantiating properly our compilers for a practical scheme can be the
subject of future work.
2 Notation and Non-Malleability Definitions
We denote the security parameter by λ and use “|” as concatenation operator (i.e., if a and b are
two strings then by a|b we denote the concatenation of a and b). For a finite set Q, x← Q sampling
of x from Q with uniform distribution. We use the abbreviation ppt that stays for probabilistic
polynomial time. We use poly(·) to indicate a generic polynomial function.
A polynomial-time relation Rel (or polynomial relation, in short) is a subset of {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗
such that membership of (x,w) in Rel can be decided in time polynomial in |x|. For (x,w) ∈ Rel,
we call x the instance and w a witness for x. For a polynomial-time relation Rel, we define the
NP-language LRel as LRel = {x|∃w : (x,w) ∈ Rel}. Analogously, unless otherwise specified, for an
NP-language L we denote by RelL the corresponding polynomial-time relation (that is, RelL is such
that L = LRelL). We denote by Lˆ the language that includes both L and all well formed instances
that do not have a witness. Moreover we require that membership in Lˆ can be tested in polynomial
time. We implicitly assume that a PPT algorithm that is supposed to receive an instance in Lˆ will
abort immediately if the instance does not belong to Lˆ.
Let A and B be two interactive probabilistic algorithms. We denote by 〈A(α), B(β)〉(γ) the
distribution of B’s output after running on private input β with A using private input α, both
running on common input γ. Typically, one of the two algorithms receives 1λ as input. A transcript
of 〈A(α), B(β)〉(γ) consists of the messages exchanged during an execution where A receives a
private input α, B receives a private input β and both A and B receive a common input γ.
Moreover, we will refer to the view of A (resp. B) as the messages it received during the execution
of 〈A(α), B(β)〉(γ), along with its randomness and its input. We denote by Ar an algorithm A that
receives as randomness r. We say that a protocol (A,B) is public coin if B sends to A random bits
only.
Standard definitions and their variants w.r.t. subexponential-time adversaries can be found
in App. A. We will say that a complexity assumption is T˜ -breakable if it can be broken with
overwhelming probability by running in time T˜ .
2.1 Non-Malleable Commitments and Zero Knowledge
Here we follow [LPV08]. Let Π = (Sen,Rec) be a statistically binding commitment scheme. Con-
sider MiM adversaries that are participating in left and right sessions in which poly(λ) commitments
take place. We compare between a MiM and a simulated execution. In the MiM execution the
adversary A, with auxiliary information z, is simultaneously participating in poly(λ) left and right
sessions. In the left sessions the MiM adversary A interacts with Sen receiving commitments to
values m1, . . . ,mpoly(λ) using identities id1, . . . , idpoly(λ) of its choice. In the right session A inter-
acts with Rec attempting to commit to a sequence of related values m˜1, . . . , m˜poly(λ) again using
identities of its choice i˜d1, . . . , i˜dpoly(λ). If any of the right commitments is invalid, or undefined,
its value is set to ⊥. For any i such that i˜di = idj for some j, set m˜i =⊥ (i.e., any commitment
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where the adversary uses the same identity of one of the honest senders is considered invalid). Let
mim
A,m1,...,mpoly(λ)
Π (z) denote a random variable that describes the values m˜1, . . . , m˜poly(λ) and the
view of A, in the above experiment. In the simulated execution, an efficient simulator S directly in-
teracts with Rec. Let simSΠ(1
λ, z) denote the random variable describing the values m˜1, . . . , m˜poly(λ)
committed by S, and the output view of S; whenever the view contains in the i-th right session
the same identity of any of the identities of the left session, then mi is set to ⊥.
In all the paper we denote by δ˜ a value associated with the right session (where the adversary
A plays with a receiver Rec) where δ is the corresponding value in the left session. For example,
the sender commits to v in the left session while A commits to v˜ in the right session.
Definition 1 (Concurrent NM commitment scheme [LPV08]). A commitment scheme is concurrent
NM with respect to commitment (or a many-many NM commitment scheme) if, for every ppt
concurrent MiM adversary A, there exists a ppt simulator S such that for all mi ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) for
i = {1, . . . , poly(λ)} the following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:
{mimA,m1,...,mpoly(λ)Π (z)}z∈{0,1}? ≈ {simSΠ(1λ, z)}z∈{0,1}? .
As in [LPV08] we also consider relaxed notions of concurrent non-malleability: one-many and
one-one NM commitment schemes. In a one-many NM commitment scheme, A participates in one
left and polynomially many right sessions. In a one-one (i.e., a stand-alone secure) NM commitment
scheme, we consider only adversaries A that participate in one left and one right session. We will
make use of the following proposition of [LPV08].
Proposition 1. Let (Sen,Rec) be a one-many NM commitment scheme. Then, (Sen,Rec) is also
a concurrent (i.e., many-many) NM commitment scheme.
We say that a commitment is valid or well formed if it can be decommitted to a message m 6= ⊥.
Following [LP11b] we say that a MiM is synchronous if it “aligns” the left and the right sessions;
that is, whenever it receives message i on the left, it directly sends message i on the right, and vice
versa.
Definition 2 (synchronous NM commitment scheme). A commitment scheme is synchronous
one-one (resp., one-many) non-malleable if it is one-one (resp., one-many) NM with respect to
synchronous MiM adversaries.
Definition 3 (weak NM commitment scheme). A commitment scheme is weak one-one (resp.,
one-many) non-malleable if it is a one-one (resp., one-many) NM commitment scheme with respect
to MiM adversaries that when receiving a well formed commitment in the left session, except with
negligible probability computes well formed commitments (i.e., 6= ⊥) in the right sessions.
We also consider the definition of a NM commitment scheme secure against a MIM A running
in time bounded by T = 2λ
α
for some positive constant α < 1. In this case we will say that a
commitment scheme is T -non-malleable.
In the rest of the paper, following [GRRV14], we assume for that identities are known before the
protocol begins, though strictly speaking this is not necessary, as the identities do not appear in the
protocol until after the first committer message. MiM can choose his identity adversarially as long
as it differs from the identities used by honest senders. As already observed in previous work, when
the identity is selected by the sender the id-based definitions guarantee non-malleability without
ids as long as the MiM does not behave like a proxy (an unavoidable attack). Indeed the sender
can pick as id the public key of a strong signature scheme signing the transcript. The MiM will
have to use a different id or to break the signature scheme.
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Delayed-input non-malleable zero knowledge. Following [LP11a] we give a definition that
gives to the adversary the power of adaptive-input selection11.
Let Π = (P,V) be a delayed-input interactive argument system for a NP-language L with
witness relation RelL. Consider a ppt MiM adversary A that is simultaneously participating in
one left session and one right session. Before the execution starts, both P,V and A receive as a
common input the security parameter in unary 1λ, and A receives as auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}?.
In the left session A interacts with P using identity id of his choice. In the right session, A
interacts with V, using identity i˜d of his choice.
Furthermore, in the left session A, before the last round of Π, adaptively selects the statement
x to be proved and the witness w, s.t (x,w) ∈ RelL, and sends them to P. Also, in the right session
A, during the last round of Π, adaptively selects the statement x˜ to be proved and sends it to V.
Let ViewA(1λ, z) denote a random variable that describes the view of A in the above experiment.
Definition 4 (Delayed-input NMZK). A delayed-input argument system Π = (P,V) for a NP-
language L with witness relation RelL is NM Zero Knowledge (NMZK) if for any MiM adversary
A that participates in one left session and one right session, there exists a ppt machine S(1λ, z)
such that:
1. The probability ensembles {S1(1λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}? and {ViewA(1λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}? are compu-
tationally indistinguishable over λ, where S1(1λ, z) denotes the first output of S(1λ, z).
2. Let z ∈ {0, 1}?, and let (View, w˜) denote the output of S(1λ, z). Let x˜ be the right-session
statement appearing in View and let id and i˜d be the identities of the left and right sessions
appearing in View. If the right session is accepting and id 6= i˜d, then RelL(x˜, w˜) = 1.
The above definition of NMZK allows the adversary to select statements adaptively at the last
round both on left and right sessions, therefore any argument system that is NMZK according
to the above definition enjoys also adaptive-input argument of knowledge and adaptive-input zero
knowledge.
We stress that similarly to [SCO+01], in the above definition the simulator receives from the
adversary only the adaptively-computed instance, in contrast to the prover that receives both
instance and witness.
3 OWFs ⇒ 4-Round Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments
We start discussing a useful building block.
3.1 OWFs ⇒ 2-Round Instance-Dependent Trapdoor Commitments
Definition 5. Let 1λ be the security parameter, L be an NP-language and RelL be the corresponding
NP-relation. A triple of ppt algorithms TC = (Sen,Rec,TFake) is a 2-Round Instance-Dependent
Trapdoor Commitment scheme if the following properties hold.
11In [LP11a] the adversary selects the instance and a Turing machines outputs the witness in exponential time.
Here we slightly deviate by 1) requiring the adversary to output also the witness (similarly to [SCO+01]) and 2)
allowing the adversary to make this choice at the last round.
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Correctness. In the 1st round, Rec on input 1λ and x ∈ L outputs ρ. In the 2nd round Sen on
input the message m, 1λ, ρ and x ∈ L outputs (com, dec). We will refer to the pair (ρ, com)
as the commitment of m. Moreover we will refer to the execution of the above two rounds
including the exchange of the corresponding two messages as the commitment phase. Then
Rec on input m, x, com, dec and the private coins used to generate ρ in the commitment
phase outputs 1. We will refer to the execution of this last round including the exchange of
dec as the decommitment phase. Notice that an adversarial sender Sen? could deviate from
the behavior of Sen when computing and sending com and dec for an instance x ∈ Lˆ. As a
consequence Rec could output 0 in the decommitment phase. We will say that dec is a valid
decommitment of (ρ, com) to m for an instance x ∈ Lˆ, if Rec outputs 1.
Hiding. Given a ppt adversary A, consider the following hiding experiment ExpHidingbA,TC(λ, x)
for b = 0, 1 and x ∈ LˆR:
• On input 1λ and x, A outputs a message m, along with ρ.
• The challenger on input x,m, ρ, b works as follows: if b = 0 then it runs Sen on input m,
x and ρ, obtaining a pair (com, dec), otherwise it runs TFake on input x and ρ, obtaining
a pair (com, aux). The challenger outputs com.
• A on input com outputs a bit b′ and this is the output of the experiment.
We say that hiding holds if for any ppt adversary A there exist a negligible function ν, s.t.:∣∣∣Prob [ ExpHiding0A,TC(λ, x) = 1 ]− Prob [ ExpHiding1A,TC(λ, x) = 1 ] ∣∣∣ < ν(λ).
Special Binding. There exists a ppt algorithm that on input a commitment (ρ, com), the private
coins used by Rec to compute ρ, and two valid decommitments (dec, dec′) of (ρ, com) to two
different messages m and m′ w.r.t. an instance x ∈ L, outputs w s.t. (x,w) ∈ RelL with
overwhelming probability.
Trapdoorness. For any ppt adversary A there exist a negligible function ν, s.t. for all x ∈ L it
holds that:∣∣∣Prob [ ExpComA,TC(λ, x) = 1 ]− Prob [ ExpTrapdoorA,TC(λ, x) = 1 ] ∣∣∣ < ν(λ)
where ExpComA,TC(λ, x) and ExpTrapdoorA,TC(λ, x) are defined below12.
ExpComA,TC(λ, x): ExpTrapdoorA,TC(λ, x):
-On input 1λ and x, A outputs (ρ,m). -On input 1λ and x, A outputs (ρ,m).
-Sen on input 1λ, x, m and ρ, outputs
(com, dec).
-TFake on input 1λ, x and ρ, outputs
(com, aux).
-TFake on input tk s.t. (x, tk) ∈ RelL,
x, ρ, com, aux and m outputs dec.
-A on input (com, dec) outputs a bit b
and this is the output of the experiment.
-A on input (com, dec) outputs a bit b
and this is the output of the experiment.
12We assume wlog that A is stateful.
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OWFs ⇒ 2-round instance-dependent trapdoor commitments for any NP language.
Here we recall the construction (SenH,RecH,TFakeH) of [FS89] for Hamiltonian graphs. SenH and
RecH run as follows.
– RecH → SenH. RecH on input a graph G with n nodes computes and sends ρ to the sender,
where ρ is the 1st round of a two-round statistically binding commitment scheme from OWFs
of [Nao91].
– SenH on input a bit b, ρ and a graph G with n nodes works as follows. If b = 0 then SenH picks
a random permutation pi and computes and sends the 2nd round of the statistically binding
commitment using ρ as 1st round and committing one-by-one to all bits of the adjacency
matrix of pi(G). If instead b = 1, then SenH computes and sends the 2nd round of the
statistically binding commitment, using ρ as 1st round and committing to all bits of the
adjacency matrix of a a graph that consists of a random cycle H of n nodes. In both
cases, (ρ, com = (com1, . . . , comn2)) corresponds to the commitment of b. In the 1st case dec
corresponds to the randomness used by SenH, while in the 2nd case dec corresponds to the
decommitments of those n edges in the adjacency matrix that correspond to the cycle.
– RecH on input a bit b, a graph G with n nodes, dec and com works as follows. If b = 0
then RecH verifies that com is a commitment of the adjacency matrix of pi(G) where both pi
and the decommitments of the adjacency matrix are taken from dec. If instead b = 1 then
RecH verifies that the decommitted edges in dec correspond to a cycle that was committed
in (ρ, com).
– TFakeH runs SenH on input ρ, a graphG with n nodes and b = 0 therefore obtaining (com, dec).
Then TFakeH on input 0 and a cycle in G outputs dec. Instead on input 1 and a cycle in G,
TFakeH outputs the decommitments of the edges committed in (ρ, com) corresponding to a
cycle in pi(G) where pi was the permutation selected to compute com.
It is easy to see that the above construction is a 2-round instance-dependent trapdoor commit-
ment scheme from OWFs. While the construction can be used to commit to a bit, in the rest of
the paper we will use this construction to commit to strings by implicitly assuming that the above
steps are repeated in parallel for each bit of the string.
Moreover, note that since Hamiltonicity is an NP-complete language, the above construction
works for any NP language through NP reductions. For simplicity in the rest of the paper we
will omit the NP reduction therefore assuming that the above scheme works directly on a given
NP-language L.
3.2 4-Round Concurrent NM Commitment Scheme: (NM4Sen,NM4Rec)
Our construction is crucially based on the above 2-round instance-dependent trapdoor commitment
scheme and on the special honest-verifier zero-knowledge property of the delayed-input adaptive-
input PoK LS. The above two tools will be used along with signatures in our protocol that upgrades
a 4-round public-coin weak one-many NM commitment scheme Πwom = (Senwom,Recwom) where
the last round of Senwom is deterministic. More in details, in addition to Πwom we will need the
following tools:
1. a signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign,Ver) from OWFs [Rom90];
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2. a 2-round instance-dependent trapdoor commitment scheme TCΣ = (SenΣ,RecΣ,TFakeΣ)
from OWFs for the following NP-language
LΣ =
{
vk : ∃ (msg1, msg2, σ1, σ2) s.t. Ver(vk, msg1, σ1) = 1
AND Ver(vk, msg2, σ2) = 1 AND msg1 6= msg2
}
;
3. a 4-round delayed-input SHVZK13 proof system LS = (P,V) from OWFs (see App. A) for
the language
L =
{(
τ = (pi1wom, pi
2
wom, pi
3
wom, pi
4
wom), id
)
: ∃ (m, dec) s.t.
Recwom on input (τ,m, dec, id) accepts m as a decommitment of τ
}
that is adaptive-input PoK for the corresponding relation RelL.
Let m be the message that NM4Sen wants to commit and id be the id for this session. In the
1st round the receiver NM4Rec computes and sends the 1st round pi1LS of LS and the 1st round pi
1
wom
of Πwom using as input the id. NM4Rec also computes a pair of signature and verification keys
(sk, vk), sends the verification key vk to NM4Sen and computes and sends the first round of TCΣ
by running RecΣ on the instance vk ∈ LΣ.
Then NM4Sen on input id, the message m and the received 1st round, computes the 2nd round
pi2wom of Πwom to commit to the message m using id. Moreover NM4Sen computes the 2nd round
pi2LS of LS and runs SenΣ on input the instance vk to compute the commitment of pi
2
LS therefore
obtaining a pair (com, dec). NM4Sen sends com, pi2wom and a random message msg to NM4Rec. In
the 3rd round NM4Rec sends the 3rd round pi3wom of Πwom, the 3rd round of LS and a signature
σ (computed using sk) of the message msg. In the last round NM4Sen verifies whether or not
σ is a valid signature for msg. If σ is a valid signature, then NM4Sen computes the last round
pi4wom of Πwom, the 4th round pi
4
LS of LS and sends pi
4
wom, pi
4
LS and dec to NM4Rec. At this point
NM4Rec accepts the commitment (the transcript of our protocol generated so far) iff RecΣ on input
vk, com, dec, pi2LS accepts (pi
2
LS, dec) as a decommitment of com and the transcript for LS is accepting
for V with respect to the instance (pi1wom, pi2wom, pi3wom, pi4wom, id). The decommitment phase of our
scheme simply corresponds to the decommitment phase of Πwom.
As described before, the delayed-input SHVZK adaptive-input PoK LS is used by NM4Sen to
prove knowledge of a message and randomness consistent with the transcript computed using Πwom.
We remark that to execute LS the instance is not needed until the last round but the instance length
is required from the onset of the protocol. We will refer to the instance length as `. Since ` can be
deterministically computed on input the session id and the max possible length of the message to
commit, we will assume w.l.o.g. that ` is given in input to sender and receiver.
Fig. 1 describes in details the 4-round concurrent NM commitment scheme from OWFs.
Theorem 1. If OWFs exist, then there exists (constructively) a 4-round concurrent NM commit-
ment scheme.
Proof. As discussed earlier ΠNM4Com can be instantiated by relying on OWFs only. Therefore to
prove the theorem we just need to show that ΠNM4Com is a concurrent NM commitment scheme.
The security proof is divided in two parts. In the 1st part we prove that ΠNM4Com is indeed a
commitment scheme. Then we prove that ΠNM4Com is also concurrent non-malleable.
13See Def. 10.
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Common input: security parameter λ, instance length `, NM4Sen’s identity id ∈ {0, 1}λ.
Input to NM4Sen: m ∈ {0, 1}poly{λ}.
Commitment phase:
1. NM4Rec→ NM4Sen
1. Run (sk, vk)← Gen(1λ).
2. Run V on input 1λ and ` thus obtaining the 1st round pi1LS of LS.
3. Run Recwom on input 1
λ, id thus obtaining the 1st round pi1wom of Πwom.
4. Run RecΣ on input 1
λ and vk thus obtaining ρ.
5. Send (vk, pi1LS, pi
1
wom, ρ) to NM4Sen.
2. NM4Sen→ NM4Rec
1. Run Senwom on input 1
λ, id, pi1wom and m thus obtaining the 2nd round pi
2
wom of Πwom.
2. Run P on input 1λ, ` and pi1LS thus obtaining the 2nd round pi2LS of LS.
3. Pick a message msg← {0, 1}λ.
4. Run SenΣ on input 1
λ, vk, ρ and message pi2LS to compute the pair (com, dec).
5. Send (pi2wom, com, msg) to NM4Rec.
3. NM4Rec→ NM4Sen
1. Run Recwom on input pi
2
wom thus obtaining the 3rd round pi
3
wom of Πwom.
2. Run V on input pi2LS thus obtaining the 3rd round pi3LS of LS.
3. Run Sign(sk, msg) to obtain a signature σ of the message msg.
4. Send (pi3wom, pi
3
LS, σ) to NM4Sen.
4. NM4Sen→ NM4Rec
1. If Ver(vk, msg, σ) 6= 1 then abort, continue as follows otherwise.
2. Run Senwom on input pi
3
wom thus obtaining the 4th round pi
4
wom of Πwom
and the decommitment information decwom.
3. Set x = (pi1wom, pi
2
wom, pi
3
wom, pi
4
wom, id) and w = (m, decwom) with |x| = `. Run P on input x, w
and pi3LS thus obtaining the 4th round pi
4
LS of LS.
4. Send (pi4wom, (dec, pi
2
LS), pi
4
LS) to NM4Rec.
5. NM4Rec : Set x = (pi1wom, pi
2
wom, pi
3
wom, pi
4
wom, id) and accept the commitment iff the following conditions
are satisfied.
1. RecΣ on input vk, com, dec, pi
2
LS accepts (pi
2
LS, dec) as a decommitment of com.
2. (pi1LS, pi
2
LS, pi
3
LS, pi
4
LS) is accepting for V with respect to the instance x.
Decommitment phase:
1. NMSen→ NMRec: Send (decwom,m) to NMRec.
2. NMRec: accept m as the committed message if and only if Recwom, on input (m, decwom), accepts m
as the committed message of (pi1wom, pi
2
wom, pi
3
wom, pi
4
wom, id).
Figure 1: Our 4-round concurrent NM commitment scheme ΠNM4Com from OWFs.
Lemma 1. ΠNM4Com is a statistically binding computationally hiding commitment scheme.
Proof. Correctness. The correctness follows directly from the completeness of LS, the correctness
of Πwom, from the validity of the signature scheme Σ and from the correctness of the 2-round
instance-dependent trapdoor commitment scheme TCΣ.
Statistical Binding. Observe that the message given in output in the decommitment phase of
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ΠNM4Com is the message committed using Πwom. Moreover the decommitment of ΠNM4Com coincides
with the decommitment of Πwom. Since Πwom is statistically binding then so is ΠNM4Com.
Computationally Hiding. Computational hiding follows immediately from Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. ΠNM4Com is concurrent non-malleable.
Proof. Here we actually prove that ΠNM4Com is a one-many NM commitment scheme, and then we
go from one-many to concurrent non-malleability by using Proposition 1.
First we give an overview of the entire non-malleability proof, and then we will give more
details. We denote by {mimANMCom,mHmi (z)}z∈{0,1}? the random variable describing the view of the
MiM ANMCom combined with the values it commits in the the poly(λ) right sessions in hybrid
Hmi (z).
As required by the definition, we want to show that the distribution of the real game experiment
(i.e., the view of the MiM ANM4Com when playing with NM4Sen committing m along with the mes-
sages committed in the right sessions) and the one of the output of a simulator are computationally
indistinguishable.
The proof makes use of the following hybrid experiments.
– The 1st hybrid experiment is Hm1 (z). In this hybrid in the left session NM4Sen commits to
m, while in the right sessions NM4Reci interacts with ANM4Com for i = 1 . . . poly(λ). We
prove that in the i-th right session ANM4Com does not commit to a message m˜i =⊥ for any
i ∈ {1, . . . , poly(λ)}. The proof is by contradiction; more precisely we will show that if
ANM4Com commits to ⊥ in a session i, then we can break the security of the signature scheme.
– The 2nd hybrid experiment is HmI (z) and differs from Hm1 (z) in the way the commitment
com and the decommitment information dec are computed in the left session. More precisely,
NM4Sen runs TFakeΣ to compute a commitment com of 0
λ, and subsequently to compute a
decommitment of com to the value pi2LS (we remark that no trapdoor is needed to run TFakeΣ in
order to compute com). In more details, this experiment rewinds the adversary ANM4Com from
the 3rd to the 2nd round of the left session to extract two signatures σ1, σ2 of two different
messages (msg1, msg2) and uses them as trapdoor to run TFakeΣ. The indistinguishability
between HmI (z) and Hm1 (z) comes from the hiding and the trapdoorness of TCΣ.
– The 3rd hybrid experiment is Hm2 (z) and differs from HmI (z) in the way that the transcript
for LS is computed. In more details the SHVZK simulator S of LS is used to compute the
messages pi2LS and pi
4
LS instead of using the honest procedure P. The indistinguishability
between HmI (z) and Hm2 (z) comes from the SHVZK of LS.
We also consider the hybrid experiments H01(z), H0I(z), H02(z), that are the same hybrid ex-
periments described above with the difference that NM4Sen uses Πwom to commit to a message
0λ instead of m. From the same arguments described above we have that: mimANM4Com,mH01
(z) ≈
mimANM4Com,mH0I
(z) ≈ mimANM4Com,mH02 (z). Observe that the distribution of the view of the adversary
and the committed messages in H01(z) are indistinguishable from the output of a simulator. Now
we want to show that the view of ANM4Com along with messages committed in the right sessions in
Hm1 (z) is indistinguishable from the view of ANM4Com along with the messages committed in the
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right sessions in H01(z). In order to do this, given the indistinguishability of the hybrids discussed
above, it only remains to show that Hm2 (z) is indistinguishable from H02(z). This is ensured by the
weak one-many non-malleability of Πwom. Indeed, observe that here it suffices to rely on the weak
one-many NM commitment because we are guaranteed (from the previous arguments) that when-
ever ANM4Com completes a commitment in a right session, the corresponding message committed
through Πwom is different from ⊥ with overwhelming probability, and this holds both in Hm2 (z) and
in H02(z).
We now give more details about the hybrid experiments and the security proof.
– In the 1st experiment in the left session NM4Sen commits to m, while in the right sessions
the receivers interact with ANM4Com. We refer to this hybrid experiment as Hm1 (z).
Claim 1. Let p¯i be the probability that for i = 1 . . . poly(λ) in the i-th right sessions of Hm1 (z)
ANM4Com successfully commits to a message m˜i =⊥, then p¯i < ν(λ) for some negligible
function ν.
Proof. We prove this claim by contradiction. More specifically we assume that there exists
a right session i where ANM4Com commits to ⊥ and then we construct an adversary that
breaks the signature scheme Σ. Now we show how to extract two signatures for two different
messages in order to break the signature scheme Σ. First of all we observe that if ANM4Com
commits to ⊥ in the i-th right session, then the theorem proved by LS is false. This means
that for every p˜i2LS there exists only one p˜i
3
LS s.t. ANM4Com can compute an accepting 4th round
for LS. Since we are assuming that ANM4Com completes the i-right session with non-negligible
probability we can rewind ANM4Com sending a new 3rd round message for LS p˜i3′LS in the i-th
session possibly obtaining an accepting p˜i4
′
LS. By contradiction the only way for ANM4Com to
answer to a different 3rd round of LS is to send in the 4th round of ΠNM4Com a new p˜i
2′
LS. This
means the we have two openings of com w.r.t. two different messages (p˜i2
′
LS and p˜i
2
LS), therefore
we can extract two different signatures for two different messages by using the special binding
of TCΣ. The only thing that remains to discuss is how to behave in the left session when the
described rewind (occurring in the right session) affects also the left session. Since in the left
session the theorem proved by LS is true, we simply answer to a potentially new challenge
pi3
′
LS by computing a new accepting pi
4′
LS without changing the 2nd round of LS pi
2
LS between
rewinds.
– We consider the experiment H01(z) that corresponds to Hm1 (z) with the only difference that
the message committed using Πwom is 0
λ instead of m. We prove the following claim.
Claim 2. Let p¯i be the probability that for i = 1 . . . poly(λ) in the i-th right sessions of
H01(z) ANM4Com successfully commits to a message m˜i =⊥, then p¯i < ν(λ) for some negligible
function ν.
The security proof of this claim follows strictly the one of Claim 1.
– We now consider the 2nd hybrid experiment HmI (z) that differs from Hm1 (z) as follows. In
the left session, by rewinding the adversary ANM4Com from the 3rd to the 2nd round, two
signatures σ1, σ2 for two distinct messages (msg1, msg2) are extracted and used as trapdoor to
run TFakeΣ. The probability that ANM4Com does not give a 2nd valid signature for a randomly
15
chosen message after a polynomial number of rewinds is negligible in λ. For the above reason
the above deviation increases the abort probability of the experiment by a negligible amount.
From the hiding property of TCΣ the above holds also in case com is computed by running
TFake instead of Sen.
The transcript of an execution of HmI (z) differs from Hm1 (z) in the way the commitment com
and the corresponding decommitment information are computed. Indeed now NM4Sen runs
TFakeΣ both to compute a commitment com of 0
λ and subsequently to compute a decommit-
ment of com to the value pi2LS (we remark that no trapdoor is needed to run TFakeΣ in order
to compute com). To prove that for all m ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) mimANM4Com,mHm1 (z) ≈ mim
ANM4Com,m
HmI (z)
we proceed by contradiction constructing an adversary ATCΣ for the trapdoorness property
of the 2-round instance-dependent trapdoor commitment scheme TCΣ. First of all we observe
that by Claim 1 in Hm1 (z) we can extract from LS the messages committed by the MiM ad-
versary. This means that in the reduction to the security of TCΣ we can extract the messages
committed by ANM4Com and run the distinguisher DNM4Com (that exists by contradiction) to
distinguish mimANM4Com,mHm1 (z) from mim
ANM4Com,m
HmI (z) in order to break the trapdoorness prop-
erty of the 2-round instance-dependent trapdoor commitment scheme. Now we describe the
reduction by showing a successful ATCΣ against the challenger of TCΣ.
1. Upon receiving the 1st round from ANM4Com, ATCΣ computes pi2LS and sends it as the
challenge message together with ρ.
2. ATCΣ , upon receiving com, uses it to compute and send the 2nd round of ΠNM4Com to
ANM4Com on the left.
3. ATCΣ extracts two valid signatures of two different messages from the left therefore
obtaining the trapdoor tk for TCΣ. Then it sends tk to the challenger.
4. Upon receiving dec from the challenger, ATCΣ uses it to complete the left session against
ANM4Com.
5. ATCΣ uses the extractor of LS to extract from the poly(λ) right sessions the witnesses used
by ANM4Com to compute the LS PoKs (the witnesses correspond to the randomnesses
and committed messages in Πwom in the right sessions).
6. If the extraction fails with non-negligible probability, then ATCΣ has a non-negligible
advantage. Indeed, as proved earlier, the extraction fails with negligible probability
when the trapdoor commitment scheme is played by running its honest sender. There-
fore we can assume that the extraction succeeds with overwhelming probability, and
thus ATCΣ runs the distinguisher DNM4Com (that exists by contradiction) to distinguish
mimANM4Com,mHm1 (z) from mim
ANM4Com,m
HmI (z) in order to break the trapdoorness property of
TCΣ.
We observe that rewinds made on the right sessions do not affect the reduction. Indeed the
only non-trivial situation that can happen in the the left session consists of requiring to play
again only the 4th round of the left session having received a different 3rd round. In this
case to compute the 4th round we observe that we can reuse (dec, pi2LS). More precisely, to
compute the 4th round of Πwom we use knowledge of the message m and the randomness used
to compute the second round of Πwom. To answer to the new 3rd round of LS we run P on
input pi2LS, the new 3rd round, the randomness and the message used to compute Πwom.
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Before considering the next hybrid experiment we now discuss a special procedure to extract
the messages committed by the adversary. Starting with the transcript generated by an
execution of HmI it is trivial to extract from a right session whenever the corresponding
rewind does result in rewinding left session giving a chance to the adversary to change the
3rd round. The extractions from the remaining right sessions proceed one by one as follows.
Let i be the index of one of such right sessions. The 4th round of the left session is played
again by decommitting com to a different value pi2LS (we remark that this is possible because
we are using TFakeΣ to compute both commitment and decommitment) that still ends up
in obtaining that session i is completed successfully. Therefore multiple rewinds trying with
different values for pi2LS could be required, until a successful pi
2
LS is found. Then the extraction
is performed on session i playing always this new successful pi2LS in the left session while
rewinding session i.
The special extraction procedure discussed above allows to retrieve the messages committed
by the MiM in the execution of HmI (z). This follows by observing that the 4th round of
the sender of Πwom is deterministic and therefore the witness extracted from sessions i when
playing with the successful pi2LS in the left session, is still a valid witness for the transcript
obtained in the original execution of HmI (z)14.
– The 3rd hybrid experiment isHm2 (z) and differs fromHmI (z) in the way the transcript for LS is
computed. More precisely, the SHVZK simulator S of LS is used to compute the messages pi2LS
and pi4LS instead of using the honest procedure P. We observe that this is possible because in
this hybrid experiment the commitment com can be opened to any value pi2LS given in output by
S that uses as input pi1LS, pi3LS and x. We now prove that mimANM4Com,mHmI (z) ≈ mim
ANM4Com,m
Hm2 (z)
by contradiction constructing an adversary ASHVZK for the SHVZK of LS. The reduction
works as follows.
1. ASHVZK runs ANM4Com (both on the left and on the right sessions) according to Hm2 (z)
until the 3rd round of the left session is received.
2. ASHVZK extracts from the left session two valid signature for two different messages (as
described before), and then sends to the challenger of SHVZK the theorem x the witness
w (computed as described in Fig. 1) and the pair (pi1LS, pi
3
LS) received in the 1st and 3rd
round from ANM4Com.
3. ASHVZK, upon receiving the messages (pi2LS, pi4LS) from the challenger of SHVZK uses them
to compute and send the last round of ΠNM4Com.
4. ASHVZK extracts from the poly(λ) right sessions the witnesses used by ANM4Com to com-
pute the LS transcripts (that corresponds to the randomnesses and committed messages
of Πwom) using the same special extraction procedure described for HmI (i.e., if the ex-
traction from a right session requires to play again the 4th round of the left session
14The above argument has similarities with the adaptive-input PoK of LS where even though through rewinds
the adversarial prover can change the proved instance, still the information extracted is sufficient for the original
instance. Indeed the crucial point both in [LS90] and in our proof is that by making use of rewinds one gets some
critical information that remained unchanged through the rewinds. For the case of [LS90] the critical information
consists of the committed cycles sent in the 2nd round by the prover of [LS90], while in our case the critical information
consists of the message and randomness used in the 2nd round by the sender (i.e., the MiM adversary in case of right
sessions) of Πwom.
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then the extraction procedure is run by computing a modified 4th round of the left ses-
sion where the honest prover of LS is used, following the special extraction procedure
described for Hm1 (z)).
5. If the extraction fails in providing the messages committed in the original transcript (i.e.,
the transcript generated using the challenger in the first 3 steps) with non-negligible
probability, then ASHVZK has a non-negligible advantage. Indeed, as proved earlier, the
extraction fails with negligible probability when the transcript of LS is generated by
running its honest prover. Therefore we can assume that the extraction succeeds with
overwhelming probability, and thus ASHVZK runs the distinguisher DNM4Com (that exists
by contradiction) to distinguish mimANM4Com,mHmI (z) from mim
ANM4Com,m
Hm2 (z) in order to break
the SHVZK of LS.
– The 4th hybrid isH02(m). The only differences between this hybrid and the previous one is that
NM4Sen commits using Πwom to a message 0
λ instead of m. Even in this case the proof that
for all m ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) it holds that mimANM4Com,mHm2 (z) ≈ mim
ANM4Com,m
H02
(z) from the concurrent
weak non-malleability of Πwom. Indeed observe that here it suffices to rely on the weak
one-many NM commitment because we are guaranteed (from the previous arguments) that
whenever ANM4Com completes a commitment in a right session, the corresponding message
committed through Πwom is different from ⊥ with overwhelming probability, and this holds
both in Hm2 (z) and in H02(z). To prove the indistinguishability between those two hybrids
experiments we proceed by contradiction constructing an adversary Awom that breaks the
weak one-many non-malleability property of Πwom.
Loosely speaking Πwom acts as NM4Sen with ANM4Com with the following differences: 1)
NM4Sen plays as proxy between Cwom and ANM4Com w.r.t. messages of Πwom in the main
thread; 2) a second signature is extracted from the left session through rewinds; 3) random
strings are played to simulate the receiver of Πwom during rewinds. Then Awom runs Dwom
on input the messages m˜1, . . . , m˜poly(n) committed by Awom and his randomness. Therefore
Dwom reconstructs the view of ANM4Com (by using the randomness received as input) and
uses it along with the messages m˜1, . . . , m˜poly(n) as inputs of DNM4Com giving in output what
DNM4Com outputs. Since by contradiction DNM4Com distinguishes between mimANM4Com,mHm2 (z)
and mimANM4Com,mH02
(z) also Dwom can tell apart which message has been committed by the
MiM adversary Awom. We stress that to complete the reduction we need to extract two
signatures for two distinct messages in the left session. This is done by rewinding the MiM
adversary ANM4Com from the third to the second round of the left session. When the rewind
occurs ANM4Com also rewinds the receiver of the right session, rewinding also the receiver of
Πwom involved in the security reduction. To avoid this issue in the reduction we answer as a
receiver of Πwom would have done (we remark that this can be done because Πwom is public
coin) for all rewinds that occur in the right session, so that the reduction does not rewind the
receiver of Πwom.
The proof ends by observing that for all m ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) the following holds:
mimANM4Com,mHm1 (z) ≈ mim
ANM4Com,m
HmI (z) ≈ mim
ANM4Com,m
Hm2 (z) ≈
≈ mimANM4Com,mH02 (z) ≈ mim
ANM4Com,m
H0I
(z) ≈ mimANM4Com,mH01 (z).
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pi2ext(s0), pi
2
sLS, msg
pi3ext(s0), pi
3
sLS, σ
s1, pi
4
ext(s0), pi
4
sLS
PZK(id) VZK(id)
pi1ext(s0), pi
1
sLS, vk
Upon receiving x,w s.t.
(x,w) ∈ RelL set s1 = w ⊕ s0
• vk is a verification key of a signature scheme.
• τ = (pi1ext, pi2ext, pi3ext, pi4ext) is the transcript of 〈Senext(m),Recext〉(id).
• (pi1sLS, pi2sLS, pi3sLS, pi4sLS) is the transcript of sLS proving knowledge of either the decommitment of τ to a
message s0 s.t. (x,w = s0 ⊕ s1) ∈ RelL or of two valid signatures of two different messages w.r.t vk.
Figure 2: Informal description of our delayed-input 4-round NMZK AoK ΠZK.
4 4-Round Delayed-Input NMZK from CRHFs
Our construction is based on a compiler that takes as input any 4-round public-coin extractable
one-one NM commitment scheme Πext = (Senext,Recext), a delayed-input adaptive-input statistical
WI adaptive-input AoK sLS = (P,V), a signature scheme, and outputs a delayed-input 4-round
NMZK AoK ΠZK = (PZK,VZK) for the NP-language L and corresponding relation RelL.
The high-level idea of our compiler is depicted in Fig. 2. In the 1st round VZK computes and
sends the 1st round pi1sLS of sLS and the 1st round pi
1
ext of Πext to PZK. Also VZK computes a pair
of signature and verification keys (sk, vk) and sends vk to PZK. PZK input the session-id id, picks
a random string s0, then computes and sends to VZK the 2nd round pi2ext of Πext to commit to the
message s0 using id as session-id. Moreover PZK computes the 2nd round pi2sLS of sLS and sends it
along with a random message msg to VZK. In the 3rd round VZK sends the 3rd round pi3ext of Πext,
the 3rd round of sLS and a signature σ (computed using sk) of msg to PZK. In the last round upon
receiving x,w s.t. (x,w) ∈ RelL, PZK verifies whether or not σ is a valid signature for msg. If σ
is a valid signature, then PZK computes the last round pi4ext of Πext and the 4th round pi4sLS of sLS.
Finally, PZK sets s1 = s0⊕w and sends (pi4ext, pi4sLS, s1) to VZK. The delayed-input statistical WIAoK
protocol sLS is used by PZK to prove either 1) knowledge of a message s0 and randomness that are
consistent with the transcript computed using Πext and s.t. (x, s1 ⊕ s0) ∈ RelL or 2) knowledge of
signatures of two different messages w.r.t vk.
For constructing our ΠZK = (PZK,VZK) for the NP-language L and corresponding relation RelL
we need the following tools:
1. a 4-round public-coin extractable one-one NM commitment scheme Πext = (Senext,Recext);
2. a signature scheme Σ = (Gen,Sign,Ver);
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3. a delayed-input adaptive-input statistical WIAoK protocol sLS = (P,V) for the language
Λ =
{(
τ = (pi1ext, pi
2
ext, pi
3
ext, pi
4
ext), id, vk, x, s1
)
: ∃ (s0, dec, msg1, msg2, σ1, σ2) s.t.(
(Recext on input (τ, s0, dec, id) accepts s0 as a decommitment of τ AND (x, s0 ⊕ s1) ∈ RelL) OR(
Ver(vk, msg1, σ1) = 1 AND Ver(vk, msg2, σ2) = 1 AND msg1 6= msg2
))}
that is adaptive-input statistical WI and adaptive-input AoK for the corresponding relation
RelΛ.
Common input: security parameter λ, the instance length ` of sLS and PZK’s identity id ∈ {0, 1}λ, and
the instance x available only at the last round.
Private input of PZK: w s.t. (x,w) ∈ RelL, available only at the last round.
1. VZK → PZK
1. Run (sk, vk)← Gen(1λ).
2. Run V on input 1λ and ` thus obtaining the 1st round pi1sLS of sLS.
3. Run Recext on input 1
λ, id thus obtaining the 1st round pi1ext of Πext.
4. Send (vk, pi1sLS, pi
1
ext) to PZK.
2. PZK → VZK
1. Pick at random s0 s.t. |s0| is the witness length for an instance of L.
2. Run Senext on input 1
λ, id, pi1ext and s0 thus obtaining the 2nd round pi
2
ext of Πext.
3. Run P on input 1λ, ` and pi1sLS thus obtaining the 2nd round pi2sLS of sLS.
4. Pick a message msg← {0, 1}λ.
5. Send (pi2ext, pi
2
sLS, msg) to VZK.
3. VZK → PZK
1. Run Recext on input pi
2
ext thus obtaining the 3rd round pi
3
ext of Πext.
2. Run V on input pi2sLS thus obtaining the 3rd round pi3sLS of sLS.
3. Run Sign(sk, msg) to obtain a signature σ of the message msg.
4. Send (pi3ext, pi
3
sLS, σ) to PZK.
4. PZK → VZK
1. If Ver(vk, msg, σ) 6= 1 then abort, continue as follows otherwise.
2. Set s1 = s0 ⊕ w.
3. Run Senext on input pi
3
ext thus obtaining the 4th round pi
4
ext of Πext and the decommitment
information decext.
4. Set xsLS = (pi
1
ext, pi
2
ext, pi
3
ext, pi
4
ext, id, vk, x, s1) and wsLS = (s0, decext,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥) with |xsLS| = `.
Run P on input xsLS, wsLS and pi3sLS thus obtaining the forth round pi4sLS of sLS.
5. Send (pi4ext, pi
4
sLS, s1) to VZK.
5. VZK : Set xsLS = (pi1ext, pi2ext, pi3ext, pi4ext, id, vk, x, s1) and accept iff (pi1sLS, pi2sLS, pi3sLS, pi4sLS) is accepting for V
with respect to xsLS.
Figure 3: Our 4-round delayed-input NMZK argument of knowledge ΠZK.
Lemma 3. ΠZK enjoys delayed-input completeness.
Proof. First we observe that completeness follows directly from the completeness of sLS, the cor-
rectness of Πext and the validity of the signature scheme Σ. Delayed-input completeness follows from
the delayed-input completeness of sLS and from the observation that PZK does not need to know
the witness to run Πext. We stress that Πext is not required to enjoy a delayed-input property.
20
Theorem 2. If Πext is a 4-round public-coin extractable one-one NM commitment scheme and
CRHFs exist then ΠZK is a delayed-input NMZK AoK for NP.
We will refer to the simulated experiment as the experiment where SimZK interacts with the
adversary emulating both a prover and a verifier. The simulator works in a pretty straight-forward
way. It commits to a random message, it extracts a second signature from the left session and
completes the execution generating the first output according to Def. 4. Then it extracts the
witness from the extractable commitment Πext played by the adversary in the right session (see
Fig. 6 for a detailed description of SimZK). Obviously we will have to show that the probability
that the message extracted is not a witness for the statement proved by the adversary in the right
session is negligible.
We will give a lemma for each of the two properties of Def. 4.
Lemma 4. {Sim1ZK(1λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈ {ViewA(1λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ , where Sim1ZK(1λ, z) denotes the
1st output of SimZK.
In order to prove the above lemma we consider an hybrid experiment H1(1λ, z). H1(1λ, z)
differs from the real execution of ΠZK in the witness used to compute messages of sLS. In more
details in H1(1λ, z) PZK extracts (through rewinds), two signatures of different messages15 that are
used as witness for sLS. Let {ViewAZKH1 (1λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ denote a random variable that describes
the view of AZK in H1(1λ, z). The adaptive-input statistical WI of sLS and the negligible prob-
ability of failing in extracting a second signature guarantee that {ViewAZKH1 (1λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ and
{ViewAZK(1λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ are statistically close.
Observe now that the only difference between H1(1λ, z) and the simulated execution is the
message committed using Πext. In more details, let x be the adaptively chosen statement proved
by PZK. In H1(1λ, z) PZK commits using Πext to a value s0 s.t. s1 = w ⊕ s0 (where (x,w) ∈ RelL).
Instead in the simulated experiment SimZK commits to a random string. Now we can claim
that {Sim1ZK(1λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ and {ViewAZKH1 (1λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ are computationally indistinguish-
able by using the computationally-hiding property of Πext. Informally, suppose by contradic-
tion that there exist an adversary AZK and a distinguisher DZK such that DZK distinguishes
{Sim1ZK(1λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ from {ViewAZKH1 (1λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ . Then we can construct an adversaryAHiding that breaks the computationally hiding of Πext in the following way. AHiding sends to the
challenger of the hiding game CHiding two random messages (m0,m1). Then AHiding acts as PZK
except for messages of Πext for which he acts as proxy between CHiding and AZK. When AHiding
computes the last round of the left session AHiding sets s1 = m0 ⊕ w. At the end of the execution
AHiding runs DZK and outputs what DZK outputs. It easy to see that if CHiding commits to m0 then,
AZK acts as in H1(1λ, z), otherwise he acts as in the simulated experiment. Note that the reduction
to the hiding property of Πext is possible because the rewinds to extract a second signature do not
affect the execution with the challenger of Πext that remains straight-line. Thus we have proved
that {ViewAZK(1λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ ≡s {ViewAZKH1 (1λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈ {Sim1ZK(1λ, z)}λ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ .
Lemma 5. Let x˜ be the right-session statement appearing in View = Sim1ZK(1
λ, z) and let id and
i˜d be the identities of the left and right sessions appearing in View. If the right session is accepting
and id 6= i˜d, then except with negligible probability, the second output of SimZK(1λ, z) is w˜ such
that RelL(x˜, w˜) = 1.
15In the proof of Lemma 5 we show that the extraction fails with negligible probability. The same analysis applies
here.
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The formal proof can be found in App. B.1. Here we give an overview. The proof relies on
hybrid experiments to prove that AZK commits to s˜0 s.t. (x˜, s˜0 ⊕ s˜1) ∈ RelL16 through Πext in the
simulated experiment.
• The 1st hybrid is H1(z) in which in the left session PZK interacts with AZK and in the right
session AZK interacts with VZK. We refer to this hybrid experiment as H1(z). Now we prove
that in the right session of H1(z) the MiM adversary AZK commits to the witness. Let x˜ be
the adaptively chosen theorem proved by AZK. By contradiction if AZK commits to a message
s′0 s.t. (x˜, s˜′0 ⊕ s˜1) /∈ RelL, then the witness used to complete an accepting transcript for sLS
consists of two valid signatures of two different messages. Then, by using the adaptive-input
AoK property of sLS we can reach a contradiction by breaking the security of Σ. Note that
this hybrid corresponds to the real experiment where AZK interacts with PZK in the left
session.
• The 2nd hybrid is H2(z) and differs from H1(z) only in the witness used to compute messages
of sLS in the left session. In more details, we rewind the adversaryAZK from the 3rd to the 2nd
round of the left session to extract two signatures σ1, σ2 of two different messages (msg1, msg2)
and we use them as witness to execute sLS in the left session. From the adaptive-statistical
WI of sLS it follows that the distribution of the message committed by AZK does not change
when moving from H1(z) to H2(z).
• The 3rd hybrid is H3(z). The only difference between this hybrid and the previous one is
that both s0 and s1 are random strings. From the non-malleability property of Πext it follows
that the distribution of the message committed by AZK does not change when switching from
H2(z) to H3(z). This is again a delicate reduction because it requires to show a successful
MiM for Πext that is supposed to work in straight-line. However the above experiment requires
to rewind the adversary in order to extract a second signature. As already discussed in the
previous section, this is the place where the public-coin property is used. Indeed this allows
us to simulate the additional answers of the honest receiver of Πext that are needed because
of the rewinds performed to extract a second signature.
Note that H3(z) corresponds to the the simulated experiment, this implies that also in the
simulated game AZK commits to the witness. Therefore, our simulator can use the extractor of
Πext to get the witness w˜ s.t. (x˜, w˜) ∈ RelL, where x˜ is the adaptively chosen theorem proved by
AZK. Now we can claim the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If CRHFs exist, then there exists (constructively) a 4-round concurrent adaptive-
input non-malleable zero knowledge.
The corollary proof follows from the fact that: Πext can be constructed from OWFs if it is
instantiate with the construction provided in [GPR16], sLS can be constructed from CRHFs (see
App. A) and Σ can be constructed from OWFs [Rom90].
16For simplicity in the rest of the proof we say that a player commits to a witness when he commits to s0 and
sends s1 in the last round s.t. (x, s0 ⊕ s1) ∈ RelL.
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5 3-Round NM Commitments from Strong OWPs
Our construction is based on a compiler that takes as input a 3-round synchronous weak one-one
NM commitment scheme Πwsyn = (Senwsyn,Recwsyn), a OWP f , an LS WIPoK for NP LS, and
outputs a 3-round one-one NM commitment scheme ΠNMCom = (NMSen,NMRec).
Let m be the message that NMSen wants to commit. The high-level idea of our compiler is
depicted in Fig. 4. The sender NMSen, on input the session-id id and the message m, computes
the 1st round of the protocol by sending the 1st round aLS of LS and the 1st round awsyn of Πwsyn
(to commit to the message m using id as session-id). In the 2nd round the receiver NMRec sends
challenges cwsyn and cLS of Πwsyn and LS, also picks and sends an element Y in the range of f .
In the 3rd round NMSen computes the 3rd round of Πwsyn and completes the transcript for LS by
sending zwsyn and zLS. Let τ = (awsyn, cwsyn, zwsyn) be the transcript of the execution of Πwsyn. LS
is used by NMSen to prove knowledge of either a decommitment of τ to a message 6=⊥ or of a
preimage of Y .
awsyn, aLS
cwsyn, cLS, Y
zwsyn, zLS
NMSen(m, id) NMRec(id)
• Y is an element taken from the range of the OWP f .
• τ = (awsyn, cwsyn, zwsyn) is the transcript of 〈Senwsyn(m),Recwsyn〉(id).
• (aLS, cLS, zLS) is the transcript of LS for proving knowledge of either the decommitment of τ to a
message 6=⊥ or of the preimage of Y .
Figure 4: Informal description of our 3-round NM commitment scheme ΠNMCom.
Our compiler needs the following tools:
1. a OWP f that is secure against ppt adversaries and that is T˜f -breakable;
2. a 3-round one-one synchronous weak NM commitment scheme Πwsyn = (Senwsyn,Recwsyn) that
is Twsyn-hiding/NM, and T˜wsyn-breakable;
3. the LS PoK LS = (P,V) for the language
L =
{
(a, c, z, Y, id) : ∃ (m, dec, y) s.t. (Recwsyn on input (a, c, z,m, dec, id)
accepts m 6=⊥ as a decommitment of (a, c, z, id) OR Y = f(y))}
that is TLS-WI for the corresponding relation RelL.
Let λ be the security parameter of our scheme. We use w.l.o.g. λ also as security parameter
for the one-wayness of f with respect to polynomial-time adversaries. We consider the following
hierarchy of security levels: T˜f << Twsyn << T˜wsyn =
√
TLS << TLS where by “T << T
′” we mean
that “T · poly(λ) < T ′”.
Now, similarly to [PW10, COSV16], we define different security parameters, one for each tool
involved in the security proof to be consistent with the hierarchy of security levels defined above.
Given the security parameter λ of our scheme, we will make use of the following security parameters:
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1) λ for the OWP f ; 2) λwsyn for the synchronous weak one-one NM commitment scheme; 3) λLS
for LS.
All of them are polynomially related to λ and they are such that the above hierarchy of security
levels holds. In the construction we assume for simplicity to have a function Params that on input
λ outputs (λwsyn, λLS, `) where ` is the length of the theorem to be proved using LS.
17 The detailed
scheme is described in Fig. 5 and a compact version is depicted in Fig. 4.
Common input: security parameters: λ, (λwsyn, λLS, `) = Params(λ), id ∈ {0, 1}λ.
Input to NMSen: m ∈ {0, 1}poly{λ}.
Commitment phase:
1. NMSen→ NMRec
1. Run Senwsyn on input 1
λwsyn , id and m thus obtaining the 1st round awsyn of Πwsyn.
2. Run P on input 1λLS and ` thus obtaining the 1st round aLS of LS.
3. Send (awsyn, aLS) to NMRec.
2. NMRec→ NMSen
1. Run Recwsyn on input id and awsyn thus obtaining the 2nd round cwsyn of Πwsyn.
2. Run V on input aLS thus obtaining the 2nd round cLS of LS.
3. Pick a random Y ∈ {0, 1}λ.
4. Send (cwsyn, cLS, Y ) to NMSen.
3. NMSen→ NMRec
1. Run Senwsyn on input cwsyn thus obtaining the 3rd round zwsyn of Πwsyn and the decommitment
information decwsyn.
2. Set x = (awsyn, cwsyn, zwsyn, Y, id) and w = (m, decwsyn,⊥) with |x| = `. Run P on input x, w,
and cLS thus obtaining the 3rd round zLS of LS.
3. Send (zwsyn, zLS) to NMRec.
4. NMRec: Set x = (awsyn, cwsyn, zwsyn, Y, id) and abort iff (aLS, cLS, zLS) is not accepted by V for x ∈ L.
Decommitment phase:
1. NMSen→ NMRec: Send (decwsyn,m) to NMRec.
2. NMRec: accept m as the committed message if and only if Recwsyn on input (m, decwsyn) accepts m
as a committed message of (awsyn, cwsyn, zwsyn, id).
Figure 5: Our 3-round NM commitment scheme ΠNMCom.
Theorem 3. Suppose there exist a synchronous weak one-one NM commitment scheme and OWPs,
both secure against subexponential-time adversaries, then ΠNMCom is a NM commitment scheme.
The proof is divided in two parts. First we prove that ΠNMCom is a commitment scheme. Then
we prove that ΠNMCom is a NM commitment scheme.
Lemma 6. ΠNMCom is a statistically-binding computationally-hiding commitment scheme.
Proof. Correctness. The correctness of ΠNMCom follows immediately from the completeness of
LS, and the correctness of Πwsyn.
Statistical Binding. Observe that the message given in output in the decommitment phase
of ΠNMCom is the message committed using Πwsyn. Moreover the decommitment phase of ΠNMCom
17To compute 1st and 2nd round of LS only the length ` of the instance is required.
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coincides with the decommitment phase of Πwsyn. Since Πwsyn is binding we have that the same
holds for ΠNMCom.
Hiding. Following Def. 13 to prove the hiding of ΠNMCom we have to show that the experiment
ExpHiding0A,ΠNMCom(λ) in which NMSen commits to a message m0 is computationally indistinguish-
able from the experiment ExpHiding1A,ΠNMCom(λ) in which NMSen commits to a message m1. In
order to prove this indistinguishability we consider the following hybrid experiments.
• The 1st hybrid experiment H0(λ) is equal to the real game experiment ExpHiding0A,ΠNMCom(λ),
with the difference that a value y s.t. Y = f(y) is computed and used as a witness for LS.
Observe that in order to compute y the commitment phase takes time T˜f . The indistinguisha-
bility between H0(λ) and ExpHiding0A,ΠNMCom(λ) comes from the adaptive-input WI of LS, that
holds against adversaries with running time bounded by TLS >> T˜f .
• The 2nd hybrid H1(λ) differs from H0(λ) in the message committed by the adversary using
Πwsyn. More precisely, Πwsyn is used by NMSen to commit to the message m1 instead of
m0. The indistinguishability between H0(λ) and H1(λ) comes from the hiding of Πwsyn and
noticing that the hiding of Πwsyn still holds against adversaries with running time bounded
by Twsyn >> T˜f .
The proof ends with the observation that H1(λ) ≈ ExpHiding1A,ΠNMCom(λ). The indistinguisha-
bility between H1(λ) and ExpHiding1A,ΠNMCom(λ) comes from the adaptive-WI property of LS and
from the observation that, as before, the adaptive-input WI of LS still holds against adversaries
with running time bounded by TLS >> T˜f .
The full proof of non-malleability can be found in App. B.2. Here we give an overview of
the proof. The proof is divided in two cases, in the first case we consider an adversarial MiM
ANMCom that acts in a synchronized way, while in the second case ANMCom is non-synchronized. In
both cases we want to show that the committed value (and the view) of ANMCom when interacting
with a prover NMSen that commits to a message m is indistinguishable from the committed value
(and the view) of a simulator. The proof for the synchronous case goes through a series of hybrid
experiments listed below.
• We consider the real game experiment Hm1 (z) in which in the left session NMSen commits to
m, while in the right session NMRec interacts with ANMCom. Now we prove that in the right
session the MiM adversary ANMCom does not commit to a message m˜ =⊥. By contradiction
if ANMCom commits to m˜ =⊥ then the witness used to complete an accepting transcript for
LS is a value y˜ s.t. f(Y˜ ) = y˜. Then, by using the adaptive PoK property of LS we can reach
a contradiction by inverting f in polynomial time.
• The 2nd hybrid is Hm2 (z) and it differs from Hm1 (z) only in the witness used to compute the
sLS transcript. The adversary ANMCom, running in sub-exponential time, computes a value
y s.t. f(y) = Y , and uses it as witness for the execution of LS. From the adaptive-input WI
(that is stronger than inverting the OWP and of breaking Πwsyn) of sLS, the view and the
committed message of ANMCom do not change between Hm2 (z) and Hm1 (z).
• We now consider the hybrid experiment H01(z) that differs from the first hybrid experiment
that we have considered Hm1 (z) in the committed message. Indeed in this case, the message
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committed in the left session is 0λ. We observe that H01(z) actually is the simulated game. As
for the hybrid experimentHm1 (z) we need to prove that in the right session the MiM adversary
ANMCom does not commit to a message m˜ =⊥. By contradiction if ANMCom commits to m˜ =⊥
then the witness used to complete an accepting transcript for LS is a value y˜ s.t. f(Y˜ ) = y˜.
Then, by using the PoK property of LS we can reach a contradiction by inverting f in
polynomial time.
• The last hybrid experiment that we consider is H02(z) and it differs from H01(z) only in the
witness used to compute the sLS transcript. In more details the adversary ANMCom, running
in sub-exponential time, computes a value y s.t. f(y) = Y , and uses it as witness for the
execution of LS. From the adaptive-input WI (that is stronger than inverting the OWP and
of breaking Πwsyn) of sLS, the view and the committed message of ANMCom do not change
between H02(z) and H01(z).
To conclude this proof we show that the view and the committed message of ANMCom acting in
Hm1 (z) are indistinguishable from the view and the committed message of ANMCom acting in H01(z).
For what has been argued above, it remains to show that the view and the committed message of
Hm2 (z) are indistinguishable from the view and the committed message of H02(z). This is ensured by
the synchronous weak non-malleability of Πwsyn. Here we need only to use a weak synchronous one-
one NM commitment since we are guaranteed, from the above arguments, that whenever ANMCom
completes a commitment in a right session the underlying commitment computed through Πwsyn
corresponds to ⊥ with negligible probability only both in Hm2 (z) and in H02(z).
The proof for the asynchronous case is much simpler and relies on the hiding of ΠNMCom. More
precisely we observe that in case of asynchronous scheduling it is possible to rewind the adversary
ANMCom without rewinding the sender in the left session. This allows us to extract (in polynomial
time) the witness used by the adversary in the execution of LS, that with overwhelming probability
corresponds to the committed message. Therefore we contradict the hiding of ΠNMCom.
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A Standard Definitions and Tools
Definition 6 (One-way function (OWF)). A function f : {0, 1}? → {0, 1}? is called one way if the
following two conditions hold:
• there exists a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that on input y in the domain of f
outputs f(y);
• for every ppt algorithm A there exists a negligible function ν, such that for every auxiliary
input z ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ):
Prob
[
y←{0, 1}? : A(f(y), z) ∈ f−1(f(y)) ] < ν(λ).
We say that a OWF f is a one-way permutation (OWP) if f is a permutation.
We will require that an algorithm that runs in time T˜ = 2λ
α
for some positive constant α < 1,
can invert a OWP f . In this case we say that f is T˜ -breakable.
Definition 7 (Strong Signatures [CPS13]). A triple of ppt algorithms (Gen, Sign,Ver) is called a
signature scheme if it satisfies the following properties.
Validity: For every pair (s, v)← Gen(1λ), and every m ∈ {0, 1}λ, we have that
Ver(v,m,Sign(s,m)) = 1.
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Security: For every ppt A, there exists a negligible function ν, such that for all auxiliary input
z ∈ {0, 1}? it holds that:
Pr[(s, v)← Gen(1λ); (m,σ)← ASign(s,·)(z, v) ∧ Ver(v,m, σ) = 1 ∧ (m,σ) /∈ Q] < ν(λ)
where Q denotes the list of query-answer pairs for all queries asked by A to the oracle Sign(s, ·).
Definition 8 (Computational indistinguishability). Let X = {Xλ}λ∈N and Y = {Yλ}λ∈N be en-
sembles, where Xλ’s and Yλ’s are probability distribution over {0, 1}l, for same l = poly(λ). We
say that X = {Xλ}λ∈N and Y = {Yλ}λ∈N are computationally indistinguishable, denoted X ≈ Y ,
if for every ppt distinguisher D there exists a negligible function ν such that for sufficiently large
λ ∈ N, ∣∣∣Prob [ t← Xλ : D(1λ, t) = 1 ]− Prob [ t← Yλ : D(1λ, t) = 1 ] ∣∣∣ < ν(λ).
We note that in the usual case where |Xλ| = Ω(λ) and λ can be derived from a sample of Xλ,
it is possible to omit the auxiliary input 1λ. In this paper we also use the definition of Statistical
Indistinguishability. This definition is the same as Definition 8 with the only difference that the
distinguisher D is unbounded. In this case use X ≡s Y to denote that two ensembles are statistically
indistinguishable.
Definition 9 (Delayed-input proof/argument system). A pair of ppt interactive algorithms Π =
(P,V) constitutes a proof system (resp., an argument system) for an NP-language L, if the fol-
lowing conditions hold:
Completeness: For every x ∈ L and w such that (x,w) ∈ RelL, it holds that:
Prob [ 〈P(w),V〉(x) = 1 ] = 1.
Soundness: For every interactive (resp., ppt interactive) algorithm P?, there exists a negligible
function ν such that for every x /∈ L and every z:
Prob [ 〈P?(z),V〉(x) = 1 ] < ν(|x|).
A proof/argument system Π = (P,V) for an NP-language L, enjoys delayed-input completeness
if P needs x and w only to compute the last round and V needs x only to compute the output. Before
that, P and V run having as input only the size of x. The notion of delayed-input completeness
was defined in [CPS+16b].
An interactive protocol Π = (P,V) is public coin if, at every round, V simply tosses a predeter-
mined number of coins (random challenge) and sends the outcome to the prover.
We say that the transcript τ of an execution b = 〈P(z),V〉(x) is accepting if b = 1.
Definition 10 (Special Honest-Verifier Zero Knowledge (SHVZK)). Consider a public-coin proof/argument
system Π = (S,P,V) for an NP-language L where the verifier sends m messages of length
`1, . . . , `m. We say that Π is SHVZK if there exists a PPT simulator algorithm S that on in-
put any x ∈ L, security parameter 1λ and any c1 ∈ {0, 1}`1 , . . . , cm ∈ {0, 1}`m , outputs a transcript
for proving x ∈ L where c1, . . . , cm are the messages of the verifier, such that the distribution of the
output of S is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of a transcript obtained when
V sends c1, . . . , cm as challenges and P runs on common input x and any w such that (x,w) ∈ RelL.
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Witness indistinguishability. Let View
P(w)
V?(z)(x) be the random variable that denotes V?’s view
in an interaction with P when V? is given auxiliary input z, P is given witness w, and both parties
are given common input x.
Definition 11 (Witness Indistinguishability (WI)). An argument/proof system Π = (P,V) for
NP-language L, is Witness Indistinguishable (WI) for the corresponding relation RelL if, for every
malicious ppt verifier V?, for all auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}? and for all x,w,w′ such that (x,w) ∈
RelL and (x,w
′) ∈ RelL, the following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:
{ViewP(w)V?(z)(x)} ≈ {View
P(w′)
V?(z) (x)}.
The notion of a statistically WI proof/argument system is obtained by requiring that the two
ensembles {ViewP(w)V?(z)(x)} and {View
P(w′)
V?(z) (x)} are statistically indistinguishable.
Obviously one can generalize the above definitions of WI to their natural adaptive-input variant,
where the adversarial verifier can select the statement and the witnesses adaptively, before the
prover plays the last round.
In this paper we also consider a definition where the adaptive-WI property of the argument/proof
system still holds against a distinguisher with running time bounded by T = 2λ
α
for some constant
positive constant α < 1. In this case we say that the instantiation of WI proof system is T -Witness
Indistinguishable (T -WI).
Definition 12 (Proof of Knowledge [LP11b]). A proof system Π = (P,V) is a proof of knowledge
(PoK) for the relation RelL if there exist a probabilistic expected polynomial-time machine E, called
the extractor, such that for every algorithm P?, there exists a negligible function ν, every statement
x ∈ {0, 1}λ, every randomness r ∈ {0, 1}? and every auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1}?,
Prob [ 〈P?r (z),V〉(x) = 1 ] ≤ Prob
[
w ← EP?r (z)(x) : (x,w) ∈ RelL
]
+ ν(λ).
We also say that an argument system Π is a argument of knowledge (AoK) if the above condition
holds w.r.t. any ppt P?.
In this paper we also consider the adaptive-input PoK/AoK property. Adaptive-input PoK/AoK
ensures that the PoK/AoK property still holds when a malicious prover can choose the statement
adaptively at the last round. In this case, to be consistent with Definition 12 of PoK/AoK where
the extractor algorithm E takes as input the statement proved by P?, we have to consider a
different extractor algorithm. This extractor algorithm takes as input the randomness r′ of V, the
randomness r of P? and outputs the witness for x ∈ L, where x is selected by P?r when interacting
with Vr′ .
In this paper we use the 3-round public-coin WI PoK (WIPoK) proposed by Lapidot and
Shamir [LS90], that we denote by LS. LS enjoys delayed-input completeness since the inputs for
both P and V are needed only to play the last round, and only the length of the instance is needed
earlier. LS also enjoys adaptive-input PoK and adaptive-input WI. We also use a 4-round delayed-
input, adaptive-input AoK, and adaptive-input statistical WI argument of knowledge (WIAoK),
that is a variant of LS [Fei90]. More in details, the WI of LS relies on the hiding property of the
underlying commitment scheme, therefore if the prover of LS uses a 2-round statistically hiding
commitment scheme, then we obtain adaptive-input statistical WIAoK. Note that this variation
of LS requires an additional round from verifier to prover in order to send the first round of the
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statistically hiding commitment scheme. Finally, in this work we also use another 4-round variant of
LS that relies on OWFs only. The additional round is indeed needed to instantiate the commitment
scheme used in LS under any OWF. We finally stress that all variants of LS that we consider in
this paper are SHVZK.
A.1 Commitment Schemes
Definition 13 (Commitment Scheme). Given a security parameter 1λ, a commitment scheme
CS = (Sen,Rec) is a two-phase protocol between two ppt interactive algorithms, a sender Sen and
a receiver Rec. In the commitment phase Sen on input a message m interacts with Rec to produce
a commitment com. In the decommitment phase, Sen sends to Rec a decommitment information d
such that Rec accepts m as the decommitment of com.
Formally, we say that CS = (Sen,Rec) is a perfectly binding commitment scheme if the following
properties hold:
Correctness:
• Commitment phase. Let com be the commitment of the message m given as output of an
execution of CS = (Sen,Rec) where Sen runs on input a message m. Let d be the private
output of Sen in this phase.
• Decommitment phase18. Rec on input m and d accepts m as decommitment of com.
Statistical (resp. Computational) Hiding([Lin10]): for any adversary (resp. ppt ad-
versary) A and a randomly chosen bit b ∈ {0, 1}, consider the following hiding experiment
ExpHidingbA,CS(λ):
• Upon input 1λ, the adversary A outputs a pair of messages m0,m1 that are of the same
length.
• Sen on input the message mb interacts with A to produce a commitment of mb.
• A outputs a bit b′ and this is the output of the experiment.
For any adversary (resp. ppt adversary) A, there exist a negligible function ν, s.t.:∣∣∣Prob [ ExpHiding0A,CS(λ) = 1 ]− Prob [ ExpHiding1A,CS(λ) = 1 ] ∣∣∣ < ν(λ).
Statistical (resp. Computational) Binding: for every commitment com generated during
the commitment phase by a possibly malicious unbounded (resp. malicious ppt) sender Sen?
there exists a negligible function ν such that Sen?, with probability at most ν(λ), outputs two
decommitments (m0, d0) and (m1, d1), with m0 6= m1, such that Rec accepts both decommit-
ments.
We also say that a commitment scheme is perfectly binding iff ν(λ) = 0.
We also consider the definition of a commitment scheme where computational hiding still holds
against an adversary A running in time bounded by T = 2λα for some positive constant α < 1. In
this case we will say that a commitment scheme is T -hiding. We will also say that a commitment
scheme is T˜ -breakable to specify that an algorithm running in time T˜ = 2λ
β
, for some positive
constant β < 1, recovers the (if any) only message that can be successfully decommitment.
18In this paper we consider a non-interactive decommitment phase only.
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Extractable commitment schemes. Informally, a commitment scheme is extractable if there
exists an efficient extractor that having black-box access to any efficient malicious ppt sender
ExSen? that successfully performs the commitment phase, outputs the only committed string that
can be successfully decommitted.
Definition 14 (Extractable Commitment Scheme [PW09]). A perfectly (resp. statistically) binding
commitment scheme ExCS = (ExSen,ExRec) is an extractable commitment scheme if there exists
an expected ppt extractor ExtCom that given oracle access to any malicious ppt sender ExSen?,
outputs a pair (τ, σ?) such that the following two properties hold:
- Simulatability: τ is identically distributed to the view of ExSen? (when interacting with an
honest ExRec) in the commitment phase.
- Extractability: the probability that there exists a decommitment of τ to σ, where σ 6= σ? is 0
(resp. negligible).
B Formal Proofs
B.1 Last Part of the Proof of 4-Round NMZK
The security proof goes through a sequence of hybrid experiments that prove that AZK commits to
s˜0 s.t. (x˜, s˜0 ⊕ s˜1) ∈ RelL during the simulated experiment. Once we have ensured that in all the
hybrids the distribution of the message committed by AZK does not change, we show that if the
right session is accepting and id 6= i˜d we can recover the witness used by AZK (that is internally
executed by SimZK).
Let p be the probability that in the real game AZK concludes the left session. We start consid-
ering the hybrid H1 in which in the left session PZK interacts with AZK and in the right session
VZK interacts with AZK. We refer to this hybrid experiment as H1(z). Details follow below.
H1(z).
Left session:
1. Second round, upon receiving (vk, pi1sLS, pi
1
ext) from AZK.
1.1. Pick at random s0.
1.2. Run Senext on input 1
λ, id, pi1ext and s0 thus obtaining the 2nd round pi
2
ext of Πext.
1.3. Run P on input 1λ, ` and pi1sLS thus obtaining the 2nd round pi2sLS of sLS.
1.4. Pick a message msg← {0, 1}λ.
1.5. Send (pi2ext, pi
2
sLS, msg) to AZK.
2. Fourth round, upon receiving (pi3ext, pi
3
sLS, σ, x, w) from AZK.
2.1. If Ver(vk, msg, σ) 6= 1 then abort, continue as follows otherwise.
2.2. Set s1 = s0 ⊕ w.
2.3. Run Senext on input (pi
1
ext, pi
3
ext) thus obtaining the 4th round pi
4
ext of Πext and the
decommitment information decext.
2.4. Set xsLS = (pi
1
ext, pi
2
ext, pi
3
ext, pi
4
ext, id, vk, x, s1) and wsLS = (s0, decext,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥) with
|xsLS| = `. Run P on input xsLS, wsLS, pi1sLS and pi3sLS thus obtaining the 4th round
pi4sLS of sLS.
2.5. Send (pi4ext, pi
4
sLS, s1) to AZK.
Right session: act as a proxy between AZK and VZK.
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We now prove that in the right session of H1(z) the MiM adversary AZK does not complete
successfully the right session committing to a message s′0 s.t. (x˜, s˜′0⊕ s˜1) /∈ RelL. More formally we
want to prove the following claim.
Claim 3. Let p¯ be the probability that in the right session of H1(z) AZK successfully commits to a
message s′0 s.t. (x˜, s˜′0 ⊕ s˜1) /∈ RelL, and the verifier outputs 1. Then p¯ < ν(λ) for some negligible
function ν.
The highl-level idea of the proof of this claim follows below. Suppose by contradiction that
the claim does not hold, then we can construct an adversary AΣ that breaks the security of the
signature scheme Σ. Let vk be the challenge verification key. The idea of the security proof is
to create an adversary AΣ that interacts against the MiM adversary AZK sending vk in the 1st
round of the right session and extracting the witness used by AZK to execute sLS. Because by
contradiction we are assuming that AZK does not commit to a witness then, with non-negligible
probability, the witness extracted by sLS will be a pair of signatures (σ1, σ2) for a pair of different
messages (msg1, msg2) s.t. Ver(vk, msg1, σ1) = 1 and Ver(vk, msg2, σ2) = 1.
The 2nd hybrid that we consider isH2(z) and it differs fromH1(z) only in the way the transcript
of sLS is computed. In more details, by rewinding the adversary AZK from the 3rd to the 2nd round
it is possible to extract two signatures σ1, σ2 of two different messages (msg1, msg2) and use them
as a witness to execute the WIAoK sLS. As discussed earlier, after λ/p rewinds a second signature
is obtained with overwhelming probability. For the above reason we can claim that the probability
that in H2(z) the output of the experiment is abort is statistically close to the probability that
in H1(z) the output of the experiment is abort. The formal description of H2(z) is the following
experiment.
H2(z).
Left session:
1. Second round, upon receiving (vk, pi1sLS, pi
1
ext) from AZK.
1.1. Pick at random s0.
1.2. Run Senext on input 1
λ, id, pi1ext and s0 thus obtaining the 2nd round pi
2
ext of Πext.
1.3. Run P on input 1λ, ` and pi1sLS thus obtaining the 2nd round pi2sLS of sLS.
1.4. Pick a message msg1 ← {0, 1}λ.
1.5. Send (pi2ext, pi
2
sLS, msg1) to AZK.
2. Fourth round, upon receiving (pi3ext, pi
3
sLS, σ1, x, w) from AZK.
2.1. If Ver(vk, msg1, σ) 6= 1 then abort, continue as follows otherwise.
2.2. Repeat Step 1.4, 1.5 and follow-up right-session messages up to λ/p times in order to obtain a
signature σ2 of a random message msg2 6= msg1. Abort if case of failure in obtaining σ2.
2.3. Run Senext on input (pi
1
ext, pi
3
ext) thus obtaining the 4th round pi
4
ext of Πext.
2.4. Set xsLS = (pi
1
ext, pi
2
ext, pi
3
ext, pi
4
ext, id, vk, x, s1) and wsLS = (⊥,⊥, msg1, msg2, σ1, σ2) with
|xsLS| = `. Run P on input xsLS, wsLS, pi1sLS and pi3sLS thus obtaining the 4th round
pi4sLS of sLS.
2.5. Set s1 = w ⊕ s0.
2.6. Send (pi4ext, pi
4
sLS, s1) to AZK.
Right session: act as a proxy between AZK and VZK.
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By the adaptive-input statistical WI of sLS the distribution of the message committed by AZK
does not change when moving from H1(z) to H2(z).
The next hybrid is H3(z). The only differences between this hybrid and the previous one is
that now s0 ⊕ s1 is a random string. Formally H3(z) is the following experiment.
H3(z).
Left session:
1. Second round, upon receiving (vk, pi1sLS, pi
1
ext) from AZK.
1.1. Pick at random s0.
1.2. Run Senext on input 1
λ, id and s0 thus obtaining the 2nd round pi
2
ext of Πext.
1.3. Run P on input 1λ, ` and pi1sLS thus obtaining the 2nd round pi2sLS of sLS.
1.4. Pick a message msg1 ← {0, 1}λ.
1.5. Send (pi2ext, pi
2
sLS, msg1) to AZK.
2. Fourth round, upon receiving (pi3ext, pi
3
sLS, σ1, x, w) from AZK.
2.1. If Ver(vk, msg1, σ1) 6= 1 then abort, continue as follows otherwise.
2.2. Repeat Step 1.4, 1.5 and follow-up right-session messages up to λ/p times in order
to obtain a signature σ2 of a random message msg2 6= msg1. Abort if case of failure
in obtaining σ2.
2.3. Run Senext on input (pi
1
ext, pi
3
ext) thus obtaining the 4th round pi
4
ext of Πext.
2.4. Set xsLS = (pi
1
ext, pi
2
ext, pi
3
ext, pi
4
ext, id, vk, x, s1) and wsLS = (⊥,⊥, msg1, msg2, σ1, σ2)
with |xsLS| = `. Run P on input xsLS, wsLS, pi1sLS and pi3sLS thus obtaining the 4th
round pi4sLS of sLS.
2.5. Pick at random s1.
2.6. Send (pi4ext, pi
4
sLS, s1) to AZK.
Right session: act as a proxy between AZK and VZK.
Claim 4. The distribution of the message committed by AZK does not change between H2(z) and
H3(z).
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that the claim does not hold. Then AZK in right session commits
to a witness with non-negligible probability only when PZK commits to a witness in the left session
too. Based on this observation we can construct a distinguisher Dext and an adversary Aext that
break the non-malleability of Πext. Let Cext be the challenger of the NM commitment scheme and
let (m0,m1) be the two random challenge messages.
Loosely speaking Aext acts as PZK with AZK in the left session and as VZK in the right session
with the following differences: 1) Aext plays as proxy between Cext and AZK w.r.t. messages of Πext
in the main thread; 2) a second signature is extracted from the left session through rewinds; 3)
random strings are played to simulate the receiver of Πext during rewinds. 4) Aext in the last round
of the left session sends s1 s.t. s1 = m0 ⊕ w.
Then Dext, on input the message m˜ committed by Aext and his randomness, reconstructs the
view of AZK and recovers the adaptively chosen statement x˜ proved by AZK and the messages s˜1
sent by AZK in the last round. If s˜1 ⊕ m˜ is s.t. (x˜, s˜1 ⊕ m˜) ∈ RelL then Dext outputs 0, and a
random bit otherwise. Since by contradiction AZK commits to the witness for x˜ with overwhelming
probability only when PZK commits to a witness for x, then Dext can tell apart which message has
ben committed by the MiM adversary Aext. We notice that the reduction queries to query only
once the receiver of Πext involved in the reduction. Formally the adversary Aext acts as follows.
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Aext(m0,m1, z).
Set round2 =⊥, round3 =⊥ .
Left session:
1. Upon receiving (vk, pi1sLS, pi
1
ext) from AZK forward pi1ext to Cext.
2. Upon receiving pi2ext from Cext.
2.1. Run P on input 1λ, ` and pi1sLS thus obtaining the 2nd round pi2sLS of sLS.
2.2. Pick a message msg1 ← {0, 1}λ.
2.3. Send (pi2ext, pi
2
sLS, msg1) to AZK.
3. Upon receiving (pi3ext, pi
3
sLS, σ1, x, w) from AZK.
3.1. If Ver(vk, msg1, σ) 6= 1 then abort, continue with the following steps otherwise.
3.2. Repeat Step 2.2, 2.3 and follow-up right-session messages up to λ/p times in order
to obtain a signature σ2 of a random message msg2 6= msg1. Abort in case of failure
in obtaining σ2.
3.3. Set xsLS = (pi
1
ext, pi
2
ext, pi
3
ext, pi
4
ext, id, vk, x, s1) and wsLS = (⊥,⊥, msg1, msg2, σ1, σ2)
with |xsLS| = `. Run P on input xsLS, wsLS, pi3sLS and pi3sLS thus obtaining the 4th
round pi4sLS of sLS.
3.4. Set s1 = m0 ⊕ w.
3.5. Send (pi4ext, pi
4
sLS, s1) to AZK.
Right session:
1. Upon receiving p˜i1ext from from Recext.
1.1. Run (s˜k, v˜k)← Gen(1λ).
1.2. Run V on input 1λ thus obtaining the 1st round p˜i1sLS of sLS.
1.3. Send (v˜k, p˜i1sLS, p˜i
1
ext) to AZK.
2. Upon receiving (p˜i2ext, p˜i
2
sLS, ˜msg) from AZK.
2.1. If there is no rewind phase on the left-session then send p˜i2ext to Recext and execute
the following steps. execute the following steps.
i. Upon receiving p˜i3ext from Recwsyn.
ii. Run V on input p˜i2sLS thus obtaining the 3rd round p˜i3sLS of sLS.
iii. Run Sign(s˜k, ˜msg1) to obtain a signature σ˜1 of the message ˜msg1.
iv. Send (p˜i3ext, p˜i
3
sLS, σ˜1).
2.2. Else if there is a rewind phase in the left-session then execute the following steps.
i. Run V on input p˜i2sLS thus obtaining the 3rd round p˜i3sLS of sLS.
ii. Run Sign(s˜k, ˜msg1) to obtain a signature σ˜1 of the message ˜msg1.
iii. Compute a random p˜i3ext.
iv. Send (p˜i3ext, p˜i
3
sLS, σ˜1) to AZK.
3. Upon receiving (p˜i4ext, p˜i
4
sLS, s˜1, x˜) from AZK.
3.1. Set x˜sLS = (p˜i
1
ext, p˜i
2
ext, p˜i
3
ext, p˜i
4
ext, i˜d, v˜k, x˜, s˜1) and abort iff (p˜i
1
sLS, p˜i
2
sLS, p˜i
3
sLS, p˜i
4
sLS) is not
accepting for V with respect to x˜.
3.2. Send p˜i4ext to Recext.
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Let mimAext(z) be the view and the committed message in the right session by Aext. The
distinguisher Dext takes as input mimAext(z) and acts as follows.
Dext(mimAext(z)) : Let m˜ be the committed message sent in the right session by Aext to VZK.
Reconstruct the view of AZK (using randomness in mimAext(z)) and recover the adaptively chosen
statement x˜ proved by AZK and the messages s˜1 sent by AZK in the last round. Since by contra-
diction AZK contradicts the claim, we have that Aext breaks the non-malleability of Πext because
(x˜, s˜1 ⊕ m˜) ∈ RelL with non-negligible probability in H2(z) where m0 = m˜ is committed in com,
while the same happens with negligible probability only in H3(z) where m1 is a random string.
Therefore if (x˜, s˜1 ⊕ m˜) ∈ RelL then Aext outputs 0 otherwise Aext outputs a random bit.
The proof is concluded by observing that if Cext commits to m0 then the above execution of
Aext corresponds to H2(z), otherwise it corresponds to H3(z).
We now describe how SimZK of Figure 6 works. Let ExtCom be the extractor of Πext. SimZK runs
ExtCom in order to get the witness w˜ s.t. (x˜, w˜) ∈ RelL, where x˜ is the adaptively chosen theorem
proved by AZK. Before formally describing SimZK we need to construct an augmented machine
Mext that is a malicious sender that will be black-box accessed by ExtCom.
Mext(1λ, z).
Run AZK with randomness ϕ.
Left session: Interact with AZK as in H3(z).
Right session:
1. Upon receiving p˜i1ext from from Recext.
1.1. Run (s˜k, v˜k)← Gen(1λ).
1.2. Run V on input 1λ thus obtaining the 1st round p˜i1sLS of sLS.
1.3. Send (v˜k, p˜i1sLS, p˜i
1
ext) to AZK.
2. Upon receiving (p˜i2ext, p˜i
2
sLS, ˜msg) from AZK.
2.1. If there is no rewind phase on the left-session then send p˜i2ext to Recext and execute
the following steps. execute the following steps.
i. Upon receiving p˜i3ext from Recwsyn.
ii. Run V on input p˜i2sLS thus obtaining the 3rd round p˜i3sLS of sLS.
iii. Run Sign(s˜k, ˜msg1) to obtain a signature σ˜1 of the message ˜msg1.
iv. Send (p˜i3ext, p˜i
3
sLS, σ˜1).
2.2. Else if there is a rewind phase in the left-session then execute the following steps.
i. Run V on input p˜i2sLS thus obtaining the 3rd round p˜i3sLS of sLS.
ii. Run Sign(s˜k, ˜msg1) to obtain a signature σ˜1 of the message ˜msg1.
iii. Compute a random p˜i3ext.
iv. Send (p˜i3ext, p˜i
3
sLS, σ˜1) to AZK.
3. Upon receiving (p˜i4ext, p˜i
4
sLS, s˜1, x˜) from AZK.
3.1. Set x˜sLS = (p˜i
1
ext, p˜i
2
ext, p˜i
3
ext, p˜i
4
ext, i˜d, v˜k, x˜, s˜1) and abort iff (p˜i
1
sLS, p˜i
2
sLS, p˜i
3
sLS, p˜i
4
sLS) is not
accepting for V with respect to x˜.
3.2. Send p˜i4ext to Recext.
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Input: Security parameters: λ, auxiliary input: z.
1. Run ExtCom using Mext(1λ, z) as a sender, and let (w˜,Viewext) be the output of ExtCom where w˜
denote the extracted value and Viewext is the view of Mext(1λ, z) that contains the transcript τ =
(p˜i1ext, p˜i
2
ext, p˜i
3
ext, p˜i
4
ext) (see App. A.1).
2. Use the same randomness ϕ used by Mext(1λ, z) and AZK, and reconstruct the view View of AZK by
executing the following steps.
2.1. Run AZK.
2.2. Interact in the left session with AZK as in H3(z).
2.3. Run (s˜k, v˜k)← Gen(1λ).
2.4. Run V on input 1λ thus obtaining the 1st round p˜i1sLS of sLS.
2.5. Send (v˜k, p˜i1sLS, p˜i
1
ext) to AZK.
2.6. Upon receiving (p˜i2ext, p˜i
2
sLS, ˜msg) from AZK.
i. If there is no rewind phase in the left session then execute the following steps.
A. Run V on input p˜i2sLS thus obtaining the 3rd round p˜i3sLS of sLS.
B. Run Sign(s˜k, ˜msg1) to obtain a signature σ˜1 of the message ˜msg1.
C. Send (p˜i3ext, p˜i
3
sLS, σ˜1) to AZK.
ii. Else if there is a rewind phase in the left-session then execute the following steps.
A. Run V on input p˜i2sLS thus obtaining the 3rd round p˜i3sLS of sLS.
B. Run Sign(s˜k, ˜msg1) to obtain a signature σ˜1 of the message ˜msg1.
C. Compute a random third round p˜i?ext of Πext.
D. Send (p˜i?ext, p˜i
3
sLS, σ˜1) to AZK.
2.7. Upon receiving (p˜i4ext, p˜i
4
sLS, s˜1, x˜) from AZK, set x˜sLS = (p˜i1ext, p˜i2ext, p˜i3ext, p˜i4ext, i˜d, v˜k, x˜, s˜1) and abort
iff (p˜i1sLS, p˜i
2
sLS, p˜i
3
sLS, p˜i
4
sLS) is not accepting for V with respect to x˜.
3. Let T be the transcript of the main thread in the above execution. Output (View = (ϕ, T ), w˜).
Figure 6: The simulator SimZK.
Similarly to the black-box simulator of [GK96] we assume w.l.o.g. that if a transcript τ appears
in the final output of a black-box extractor ExtCom, then ExtCom has queried the sender of the
extractable commitment Πext on every prefix of τ . SimZK, in order to reconstruct the full transcript
T of the entire execution, interacts in the right session with AZK by playing messages of τ . See
Figure 6 for more details.
B.2 Proof of NM of the 3-Round NM Commitment Scheme
We now formally prove that the commitment scheme ΠNMCom is non-malleable. This security proof
consists of two parts. In the first part we consider a MiM adversary ANMCom that interacts only
in a synchronized way with NMSen and NMRec showing that our scheme is synchronous one-one
non-malleable. In the second part we argue that the commitment scheme is non-malleable also
when A acts in a non-synchronized way. Putting together these two arguments we are able to
conclude the proof on non-malleability.
Lemma 7. ΠNMCom is a synchronous one-one NM commitment scheme.
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Common input: security parameters: λ, (λwsyn, λLS, `) = Params(λ).
Identity: id ∈ {0, 1}λ.
Internal simulation of the left session:
1. Run Senwsyn on input 1
λwsyn , id and 0λ thus obtaining the first round awsyn of Πwsyn.
2. Run P on input 1λLS and ` thus obtaining the first round aLS of LS.
3. Send (awsyn, aLS) to ANMCom.
4. Upon receiving (cwsyn, cLS, Y ) from ANMCom.
4.1. Run Senwsyn on input cwsyn thus obtaining the third round zwsyn of Πwsyn.
4.2. Run Senwsyn thus obtaining the decommitment information decwsyn of Πwsyn.
4.3. Set x =
(
awsyn, cwsyn, zwsyn, Y, id) and w = (m, decwsyn,⊥) with |x| = `. Run P on input x, w,
and cLS thus obtaining the third round zLS of LS.
4.4. Send (zwsyn, zLS) to ANMCom.
Stand-alone commitment:
1. SimNMCom acts as a proxy between ANMCom and NMRec.
Figure 7: The simulator SimNMCom.
Proof. We show that for all m ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) it holds that:
{mimANMCom,mΠNMCom (z)}z∈{0,1}? ≈ {sim
SimNMCom
ΠNMCom
(1λ, z)}z∈{0,1}?
where SimNMCom is the simulator depicted in Fig. 7.
In the first experiment, in the left session NMSen commits to m playing with ANMCom, while in
the right session ANMCom commits on the right by playing with NMRec. We refer to this experiment
as Hm1 (z). Details follow below.
Hm1 (z).
Left session:
1. First round.
1.1. Run Senwsyn on input 1
λwsyn , id and m thus obtaining the first round awsyn of Πwsyn.
1.2. Run P on input 1λLS and ` thus obtaining the first round aLS of LS.
1.3. Send (awsyn, aLS) to ANMCom.
2. Third round, upon receiving (cwsyn, cLS, Y ) from ANMCom, run as follows.
2.1. Run Senwsyn on input cwsyn thus obtaining the third round zwsyn of Πwsyn and the
decommitment information decwsyn.
2.2. Set x = (awsyn, cwsyn, zwsyn, Y, id) and w = (m, decwsyn,⊥) with |x| = `. Run P on
input x, w and cLS thus obtaining the third round zLS of LS.
2.3. Send (zwsyn, zLS) to ANMCom.
Right session: act as a proxy between ANMCom and NMRec.
The distribution of mimANMComHm1 (z) clearly corresponds to the distribution of mim
ANMCom,m
ΠNMCom
(z). We
now prove that in the right session ANMCom does not commit to a message m˜ =⊥. We can do so
by proving that the LS proof of the right session is computed by ANMCom without using as witness
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a value y˜ s.t. f(y˜) = Y˜ , where Y˜ is the value sent to ANMCom in the second round of the right
session. Formally we want have the following claim.
Claim 5. Let p¯ be the probability that in the right session ANMCom successfully commits to m˜ =⊥.
Then p¯ < ν(λ) for some negligible function ν.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that the claim does not hold, then we can construct an adversary
Af that inverts the OWP f in polynomial time. Formally we consider a challenger Cf of f that
chooses a random Y ∈ {0, 1}λ and sends it to Af . Af wins if it gives as output y s.t. Y = f(y).
Before describing the adversary we need to consider the augmented machineMf that will be used
by Af to extract the witness from LS by using the extractor E (that exists from the property of
adaptive-input PoK enjoyed by LS). Recall that in the case of an adaptive-input PoK, the extractor
takes as input the randomnesses r of the prover and r′ of the verifier of an execution of LS when
theorem x has been proved by P?. Now we are ready to describe how Mf works. Mf internally
runs ANMCom with randomness r and interacts with him as the sender NMSen does in the left
session and as the receiver NMRec does in the right session. The only difference is that all messages
of LS of the right session are forwarded to the verifier V and vice versa. Formally Mf acts as
follows.
Mf (z, Y, r).
Execute the following steps with randomness r
- Run NMSen on input m with ANMCom as in Hm1 (z).
- Upon receiving (a˜wsyn, a˜LS) from ANMCom, send a˜LS to V.
- Upon receiving c˜LS from V, run as follows.
1. Run Recwsyn on input i˜d and a˜wsyn thus obtaining the second round c˜wsyn of Πwsyn.
2. Set Y˜ = Y .
3. Send (c˜wsyn, c˜LS, Y˜ ) to ANMCom.
- Upon receiving the 3rd round of the right session (z˜wsyn, z˜LS) set
x˜ = (a˜wsyn, c˜wsyn, z˜wsyn, Y˜ , i˜d) and send (z˜LS, x˜) to V.
Now we can conclude the proof of this claim by describing how Af works. Af runs E on input
the randomness r′ (used by the verifier in an execution where x has been proved) and uses Mf as
prover with randomness r (recall that an extractor of LS plays only having access to a prover of LS).
Notice that the above execution of Mf is distributed identically to Hm1 (z). Since by contradiction
ANMCom is successful with non-negligible probability, we have that with non-negligible probability
Af in polynomial time19 outputs the value y such that f(y) = Y .
The next hybrid experiment that we consider is H01(z) that is equal to Hm1 (z) with the only
difference that the message committed using Πwsyn is 0
λ instead of m. Similarly to Hm1 (z), we have
for H01(z) the following claim.
19The extractor is an expected polynomial-time algorithm while Af must be a strict polynomial-time algorithm.
Therefore Af will run the extractor up to a given upperbounded number of steps that is higher than the expected
running time of the extractor. Obviously with non-negligible probability the truncated extraction procedure will be
completed successfully and this is sufficient for Af to invert f . The same standard argument about truncating the
execution of an expected polynomial-time algorithm is used in another proofs but for simplicity we will not repeat
this discussion.
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Claim 6. The probability that in the right session ANMCom successfully commits to a message m˜ =⊥
is p < ν(λ) for some negligible function ν.
Proof. The security proof strictly follows the one of Claim 5.
The next hybrid that we consider is Hm2 (z). Hm2 (z) differs from Hm1 (z) only in the witness used
to compute the LS transcript. Formally Hm2 (z) is the following experiment.
Hm2 (z).
Left session:
1. First round
1.1. Run Senwsyn on input 1
λwsyn , id and m thus obtaining the first round awsyn of Πwsyn.
1.2. Run P on input 1λLS and ` thus obtaining the first round aLS of LS.
1.3. Send (awsyn, aLS) to ANMCom.
2. Third round, upon receiving (cwsyn, cLS, Y ) from ANMCom, run as follows.
2.1. Run in time T˜f to compute y s.t. Y = f(y).
2.2. Run Senwsyn on input cwsyn thus obtaining the third round zwsyn of Πwsyn.
2.3. Set x = (awsyn, cwsyn, zwsyn, Y, id) and w = (⊥,⊥, y) with |x| = `. Run P on input x,
w and cLS thus obtaining the third round zLS of LS.
2.4. Send (zwsyn, zLS) to ANMCom.
Right session: act as a proxy between ANMCom and NMRec.
Claim 7. For all m ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) it holds that mimANMComHm1 (z) ≈ mim
ANMCom
Hm2 (z).
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exist adversary ANMCom and a distinguisher DNMCom
that can tell apart such two distributions. We can use this adversary and the associated distin-
guisher to construct ad adversary ALS for the TLS-witness-indistinguishable of LS. Let CLS be the
adaptive-input WI challenger. In the left session ALS acts as NMSen with ANMCom except for the
messages of LS for which he acts as a proxy between CLS and ANMCom. In the right session he
acts as NMRec with ANMCom. After the execution of the right session, ALS runs in time T˜wsyn to
obtain the message m˜ committed by ANMCom in the right session using Πwsyn. Finally ALS gives m˜
and the output view of ANMCom as input to the distinguisher DNMCom and outputs what DNMCom
outputs. Since by contradiction DNMCom distinguishes mimANMComHm1 (z) from mim
ANMCom
Hm2 (z) we have
that ALS can tell apart with non-negligible advantage which witness has been used to compute the
transcript of LS. Formally the adversary ALS works as follows.
ALS(z).
- Act as a honest receiver NMRec with ANMCom, when ANMCom plays as as a sender.
- Upon receiving aLS from CLS, run as follows.
1. Run Senwsyn on input 1
λwsyn id and m thus obtaining the first round awsyn of Πwsyn.
2. Send (awsyn, aLS) to ANMCom.
- Upon receiving (cwsyn, cLS, Y ) from ANMCom, run as follows.
1. Run in time T˜f to compute y s.t. Y = f(y).
2. Run Senwsyn on input cwsyn thus obtaining the third round zwsyn of Πwsyn and the de-
commitment information decwsyn.
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3. Set x = (awsyn, cwsyn, zwsyn, Y, id), w0 = (m, decwsyn,⊥), w1 = (⊥,⊥, y) and send (x, cLS, w0, w1)
to CLS.
4. Upon receiving zLS from CLS, send (zwsyn, zLS) to ANMCom.
After the execution with ANMCom, ALS computes the following steps:
1. Let (a˜wsyn, c˜wsyn, z˜wsyn, i˜d) be the commitment received by NMRec when playing as in Πwsyn.
Run in time T˜wsyn to compute m˜ : ∃ ˜decwsyn s.t. Recwsyn on input (m˜, ˜decwsyn) accepts m˜ as
a decomitment of (a˜wsyn, c˜wsyn, z˜wsyn, i˜d).
2. Give m˜ and the view of ANMCom to the distinguisher DNMCom.
3. Output what DNMCom outputs.
The proof ends with the observation that if CLS has used w0 as a witness then ANMCom acts as
in Hm1 , otherwise he acts as in Hm2 .
The next hybrid is H02(z). The only differences between this hybrid and Hm2 (z) is that Senwsyn
commits, using Πwsyn, to a message 0
λ instead of m. Formally H02(z) is the following.
H02(z).
Left session:
1. First round.
1.1. Run Senwsyn on input 1
λwsyn id, and 0λ thus obtaining the first round awsyn of Πwsyn.
1.2. Run P on input 1λLS and ` thus obtaining the first round aLS of LS.
1.3. Send (awsyn, aLS) to ANMCom.
2. Third round, upon receiving (cwsyn, cLS, Y ) from ANMCom, run as follows.
2.1. Run in time T˜f to compute y s.t. Y = f(y).
2.2. Run Senwsyn on input cwsyn thus obtaining the third round zwsyn of Πwsyn.
2.3. Set x = (awsyn, cwsyn, zwsyn, Y, id) and w = (⊥,⊥, y) with |x| = `. Run P on input x,
w and cLS thus obtaining the third round zLS of LS.
2.4. Send (zwsyn, zLS) to ANMCom.
Right session: act as a proxy between ANMCom and NMRec.
Claim 8. For all m ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) it holds that mimANMComH02 (z) ≈ mim
ANMCom
H01
(z).
Proof. The security proof follows the same idea of the proof of Claim 7.
Until now we have proved that mimANMComHm1 (z) ≈ mim
ANMCom
Hm2 (z) and mim
ANMCom
H02
(z) ≈ mimANMComH01 (z)
and that both in Hm1 (z) and H01(z) the adversary ANMCom commits to m˜ =⊥ only with negligible
probability. This implies that also in Hm2 (z) and H02(z) ANMCom commits to m˜ =⊥ only with negli-
gible probability. For this reason now we can prove the indistinguishability between mimANMComHm2 (z)
and mimANMComH02
(z) by relying only on the synchronous weak one-one non-malleability of Πwsyn.
Formally we prove the following claim.
Claim 9. For all m ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) it holds that mimANMComHm2 (z) ≈ mim
ANMCom
H02
(z).
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Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exists an adversaryANMCom and a distinguisher DNMCom
that can tell apart such two distributions. We can construct a distinguisher Dwsyn and an adversary
Awsyn that break the synchronous weak one-one non-malleability of Πwsyn. It is important to observe
that we can reduce the security of our scheme to the security of a synchronous weak one-one NM
commitment because the previous claims ensure that the message that ANMCom commits in the
right session (using Πwsyn) is valid with overwhelming probability. Let Cwsyn be the challenger of
the synchronous weak one-one NM commitment and let (0λ,m) be the two challenge messages
given by Cwsyn.
Loosely speaking in the left session Awsyn acts as NMSen with ANMCom with the difference that
w.r.t. to the messages of Πwsyn he acts as a proxy between Cwsyn and ANMCom. In the right session
he acts as NMRec with ANMCom and, as in the left session, acts as a proxy w.r.t. the messages
of Πwsyn exchanged between Recwsyn and Awsyn. Then Awsyn runs Dwsyn on input the message m˜
committed by Awsyn and his randomness. Dwsyn reconstructs the view of ANMCom (by using the same
randomness) and uses it and the message m˜ as inputs of DNMCom giving in output what DNMCom
outputs. Since by contradiction DNMCom distinguishes between mimANM4ComHm2 (z) and mim
ANM4Com
H02
(z),
we have that Dwsyn tells apart which message has ben committed by the MiM adversary Awsyn.
The adversary Awsyn acts as follows (we recall that this reduction is possible only because the
message scheduling that we are considering is synchronous).
Awsyn(0λ,m, z).
Left session:
1. Upon receiving awsyn from Cwsyn, run as follows.
1.1. Run P on input 1λLS and ` thus obtaining the first round aLS of LS.
1.2. Send (awsyn, aLS) to ANMCom.
2. Upon receiving (cwsyn, cLS, Y ) from ANMCom, run as follows.
2.1. Run in time T˜f to compute y s.t. Y = f(y).
2.2. Set x = (awsyn, cwsyn, zwsyn, Y, id), w = (⊥,⊥, y). Run P on input x, w and cLS thus
obtaining the third round zLS of LS.
3. Upon receiving zwsyn from Cwsyn, send (zwsyn, zLS) to ANMCom.
Right session:
1. Forward a˜wsyn to Recwsyn.
2. Upon receiving c˜wsyn from Recwsyn, run as follows.
2.1. Pick a random Y˜ .
2.2. Run V on input a˜LS thus obtaining the second round c˜LS of ΠLS.
2.3. Send (c˜wsyn, c˜LS, Y ) to ANMCom.
3. Upon receiving z˜wsyn, z˜LS from ANMCom, run as follows:
3.1. Set x˜ = (a˜wsyn, c˜wsyn, z˜wsyn, Y˜ , i˜d) and abort iff (a˜LS, c˜LS, z˜LS) is not accepted by V
for x˜ ∈ L.
3.2. Send z˜wsyn to Recwsyn.
Let mimAwsyn(z) be the view and the committed message in the right session by Awsyn. The
distinguisher Dwsyn takes as input mimAwsyn(z) and acts as follows.
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Dwsyn(mimAwsyn(z)) : Let m˜ be the committed message sent in the right session by Awsyn to
Recwsyn. Reconstruct the view of ANMCom (using the randomness given in mimAwsyn(z)) and give
it and m˜ to the distinguisher DNMCom. Output what DNMCom outputs. We observe that the
reduction could fail if ANMCom commit to ⊥ when Cwsyn commits to 0λ (by definition Πwsyn is not
secure against MiM adversary that can commit to ⊥ when the commitment on the left is honestly
generated). Actually the probability that ANMCom commits to ⊥ is negligible. This is because
mimANMComH02
(z) ≈ mimANMComH01 (z) and because of Claim 6. The proof ends with the observation that
if Cwsyn commits to m, ANMCom acts as in Hm2 , otherwise he acts as in H02.
Now we can conclude the security proof of Lemma 7 by observing that for all m ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ)
the following holds:
mimANMCom,mΠNMCom (z) = mim
ANMCom
Hm1 (z) ≈ mim
ANMCom
Hm2 (z) ≈
mimANMComH02
(z) ≈ mimANMComH01 (z) = sim
SimNMCom
ΠNMCom
(1λ, z).
We conclude the proof of Theorem 3 by proving the following lemma.
Lemma 8. ΠNMCom is a one-one NM commitment scheme.
Proof. The proofs starts with the observation that the only non-trivial adversary using a non-
synchronizing scheduling20 is the sequential scheduling where ANMCom lets the left interaction
complete before beginning the right. Considering this scheduling we now prove again that for
all m ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) it holds that
{mimANMCom,mΠNMCom (z)}z∈{0,1}? ≈ {sim
SimNMCom
ΠNMCom
(1λ, z)}z∈{0,1}? .
We prove the indistinguishability through a sequence of two hybrid experiments. The first
hybrid experiment that we consider is Hm1 (z), that corresponds to the Hm1 (z) showed in the proof
of Lemma 7 with the only difference that ANMCom acts in a non-synchronized way. Therefore
Claim 5 holds also in this case.
The second hybrid that we consider is H01(z). The only differences between this hybrid and the
previous one is that NMSen commits to the message 0λ instead of m. We observe that Claim 6
holds also in this case.
Claim 10. For all m ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) it holds that {mimANMComHm1 (z)}z∈{0,1}? ≈ {mim
ANMCom
H01
(z)}z∈{0,1}?.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exist an adversary ANMCom and a distinguisher DNMCom
that can tell apart such two distributions. We can construct an adversary AHiding that breaks the
hiding of ΠNMCom (recall the hiding property of ΠNMCom comes from Lemma 6). Let CHiding be the
challenger of the hiding game and let (m, 0λ) be two challenge messages of the hiding game sent by
AHiding. The high-level idea of this proof is that AHiding can break the hiding of ΠNMCom using the
witness extracted from the LS transcript computed by ANMCom in the right session. In more details
if the witness extract from the LS transcript corresponds to the message committed by ANMCom
20As discussed earlier, an adverary using a trivial non-syncrhonizing scheduling can be simulated by an adversary
using a syncrhonizing scheduling. Therefore the security proof for the synchronizing case applies.
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then AHiding can win the hiding game by running DNMCom. We observe that Claim 5 and Claim 6
ensure that with non-negligible probability the witness extracted from LS in Hm1 and also in H01 is
the committed message m˜.
Before describing the adversary we need to consider the augmented machineMHiding that will be
used by AHiding to extract the witness from LS by using the extractor (that exists from the property
of adaptive-input PoK enjoyed by LS). Recall that the extractor takes as input a randomness r
for the prover and a randomness r′ of Vr′ in an execution of LS where x has been proved by P?r .
Therefore AHiding runs ANMCom and interacts in the left session acting as a proxy between CHiding
and ANMCom in order to obtain the transcript τNMCom = (aNMCom, cNMCom, zNMCom) of ΠNMCom. In
the right session AHiding acts as NMRec with ANMCom.
Then AHiding usesMHiding to extract the witness of the LS transcript. The augmented machine
MHiding runs ANMCom acting in the left session with ANMCom as the sender NMSen using the mes-
sages aNMCom, zNMCom of τNMCom. In the right sessionMHiding interacts with ANMCom as the receiver
NMRec with the only difference that all the messages of LS received by ANMCom are forwarded to
the verifier V and vice versa. Now we describe the augmented machine MHiding.
MHiding(τNMCom, r, z).
Let r be the randomness used for all next steps.
- Send aNMCom to ANMCom.
- Upon receiving cNMCom from ANMCom, send zNMCom to ANMCom.
- Upon receiving (a˜wsyn, a˜LS) from ANMCom, send a˜LS to V.
- Upon receiving c˜LS from V, run as follows.
1. Run Recwsyn on input i˜d and a˜wsyn thus obtaining the second round c˜wsyn of Πwsyn.
2. Pick a random Y˜ .
3. Send (c˜wsyn, c˜LS, Y˜ ) to ANMCom.
- Upon receiving (z˜wsyn, z˜LS), set x˜ = (a˜wsyn, c˜wsyn, z˜wsyn, Y˜ , i˜d) and send (z˜LS, x˜) to V.
Now we can conclude the proof of this claim by describing how AHiding works. AHiding runs the
extractor of LS (on input the randomnesses r and r′) with oracle access to MHiding (recall that an
extractor of LS plays having oracle access to an adversarial prover of LS). We know from Claim 5
and from Claim 6 that with overwhelming probability the witness extracted from LS in Hm1 and
in H01 is the committed message m˜. Therefore, AHiding runs the distinguisher DNMCom on input m˜
and the view of ANMCom, and outputs what DNMCom outputs. The proof ends with the observation
that if CHiding commits to m ANMCom acts as in Hm1 (z), otherwise he acts as in H01(z).
Now, observe that the distribution of mimANMComHm1 (z) corresponds to the distribution of mim
ANMCom,m
ΠNMCom
(z)
and that the distribution of mimANMComH01
(z) corresponds to the distribution of simSimNMComΠNMCom (1
λ, z). With
this observation we have proved that for all m ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) the following relation holds:
mimANMCom,mΠNMCom (z) = mim
ANMCom
Hm1 (z) ≈ mim
ANMCom
H01
(z) = simSimNMComΠNMCom (1
λ, z).
The proof of Theorem 3 follows from Lemma 6, Lemma 7 and Lemma 8.
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